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the worm in the gourd

w

doesn't lovo the story of Jonah and the Whale? lt has ""ything lot the petfect
story: a plot trajectory filled with the delights of anticipated disaster, disaster fulfilled and then
miraculously overcome, a neat set of threats which actually work, and then the charming spectacle
of the non-hero in a comic sulk. It has high drama and low comedy (cows in sackcloth!) and terrific
effects, with a variety of settings that allow us to imagine great natural environments (the ocean),
spectacular fantasy locales (whale interiors) and larger-than-life urban panoramas.
Jonah has a long history of interpretation, and there can be nothing wrong with adding another
one here. Could Jonah be the Christian college? Look again at the central panel in John August
Swanson's wonderful depiction on our cover. Just before disappearing into the maw of modernity,
the slippery slope of gullet, the prophet raises his hands in an exclamation of wonder and supplication. "How can this be happening to me?" he seems to ask, eyes rolled heavenward. "I was sent to
do the Lord's work!" One of Jonah's irresistibly charming badnesses is that, though running hellbent from doing what God wants him to do, he lays claim to the privilege of God-warrant every
time he gets a chance. He wants to deny his cake and yet have its nutritional benefits.
But then, we see him in the belly of the beast. He's praying, but he's also sleeping. He knows
where he is. He's in a dark place, a place where nothing much seems to be happening, at least as far
as the mission is concerned. If, out in the light of day, he is too much in the presence of God, down
here there seem to be enough layers to cover him up. Perhaps God will forget Jonah-out of sight,
out of mind, Jonah had hoped-inside the whale, inside the depths of the ocean. Now that he has
his wish, and is in danger of being hidden from God's sight, Jonah starts to pray, and to remind God
that a prophet once saved is an investment God would do well to save again. Is it merely playful to
imagine the Christian colleges calling out from the dark depths of secularized ordinariness, forming
associations and organizing conferences, reminding themselves and God of their special calling?
And then? Well, this part of the story is not as well known as the whale part, but it is after the
great fish vomits him up that Jonah's story takes the turns that make it so intriguing and so endlessly
compelling as a moral tale. Jonah is sent to Nineveh all over again. "Go unto Nineveh, that great
city, and preach unto it the preaching that I bid thee." But when the great city pays attention and
turns to the Lord, Jonah is disappointed. He didn't want the great city to be the object of God's
mercy; instead he wanted to be the agent of its destruction. Fireworks and explosions were what
Jonah had in mind. Special effects in which his own role featured prominently. Perhaps he thought
that if the city was to be spared from destruction, it ought to be recognized by one and all that the
sparing was Jonah's doing. A moral re-awakening that doesn't come from Christian colleges? What?
No place on presidential commissions dedicated to implementing virtue in the civil sphere? Are we
faithful not to be vindicated? No national platform on which cultural mode-setters declare that the
Christian colleges were right all along? No groundswell to elect us to lead the professional organizations which have for so long marginalized us? No triumph?
Poor Jonah. He expected that being a prophet would be, well, profitable. But that seems not
to be God's idea. He will save where people turn to him, and those who experience the call to represent that message are welcome to come along on the saving mission, but had better remember

Can
Christian colleges
resist the
temptation
to want vindication
of their mission
more than
they want mercy
for the world
in which
they exist?

who has which role. Jonah thinks that he is a principal, but he is only supporting cast. Even his own
gourd, his shady bower under which he can sit and sulk, has been prepared for him by the God he
would like to think he speaks for.
Though we might be able at times to speak the preaching that we are bid to speak to the world,
we in the Christian colleges can be frail and sometimes foolish prophets. If we forget what the mission is, we can seem as sulky, recalcitrant, and blinded as Jonah. We would like to see ourselves in
starring roles in God's great salvation drama, and we have an almost comic desire to be recognized
for our efforts, even though a great deal of our time has been spent running in the opposite direction. Near the end of the story, Jonah asks if it would be better for him to die. And God answers
obliquely by referring again to his pity for the great city, and his will to save it. That's the last word,
and the story ends there. We can only hope that Jonah gets it, finally.
Peace,
GME

MLA INTERVIEW
It commences with a knock on the door.
I open, greet, shake, usher, introduce
to all the others, our pleasant
welcoming committee. This woman
is blonde, and once pretty. She now
teaches in the South; her face
is lined with desperation.
The questions begin. She leans
forward, pressing us deep into our chairs.
This is how her syllabus works. This
is how page two of her syllabus works.
Finally her eyes well, mascara
travels down her cheeks. "I just want
to go back," she says. "I want
to go home. California is my home."
I bring her tissues from the bathroom.
Otherwise, we pretend this is not
happening. At precisely the end
of an hour, when the woman
gets up, we say goodbye but no
one touches her hand.

Paul Willis

Benedictine Values and Building
Campus Community
Carney Strange
with Harry Hagan, OSB

"Benedictine spirituality is clearly rooted in living ordinary life with
extraordinary awareness and commitment. (Chittister, 1992, 123)

w

we wish to elevate the natute of om wmk as educato<S we often invoke symbols of

community. We call ourselves a community of scholars. We are members of an academic community. We serve the community of students, and we participate in various professional communities
in our respective fields, gauging our efforts and outcomes by their community standards. The concept of community has embedded itself among our most treasured values in the academy, a concept
so important to our professional psyche that we return to it time and again to renew our sense of
commitment and importance in education; yet it remains as elusive as ever in our attempts to build
it. What is community and how can it shape the policies and practices of higher education? This is a
question that forms the starting point for this examination. To explore this notion we turn to one of
the most effective and persistent forms of community life in western culture-monasticism. History
should be able to help us understand possibilities and complexities; thus, we believe that the historical wisdom of the monastic tradition has clear links to many current concerns and issues in higher
education. An understanding of its fundamentals can lead to relevant solutions.
The writings of early theologians and historians are replete with observations and ideas that,
although predating modern constructions of higher education, speak persuasively, if not directly, to
many of the components we now accept as essential to such a construction. For example, Antony of
Egypt, who took up the life of a desert hermit in the third century, would enter into a master-disciple relationship with those who would join him as apprentices. This is an ancient way of learning
that, newly rediscovered by educators today, becomes "mentoring." In addition to hermitages, there
soon developed another way of monastic life: the cenobium, i.e. groups of men and women who
gathered together, as "cenobites," to share a common life in community. About 335 A.D. Pachomius
wrote the first rule for those living in communities which laid out the regulations for "the good
order to be preserved in everyday affairs, such as food, drink, use of books, care of the sick, coming
late to prayer" (Fry, 29). A parallel might be found in the purposes and procedures of a modern day
college handbook.
Origen (185-254 A.D.), an early theologian, had an important impact on monasticism. He
distinguished between praxis (action) and theoria (contemplation) as two overlapping and complementary aspects of a person's spiritual life; as such it seems to describe what we recognize now as
whole learning. In addition, Origen laid out three stages of the spiritual life: the purgative (conversion), the illuminative (understanding), and the unitive (integration). Clearly the concern with
models of developmental structures today is not an exclusively modern idea. Basil the Great, a
fourth century theologan, critiqued the hermit life suggesting that only community living can provide the feedback needed to know one's defects and to move from self-centered pride to the gen-
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erosity of love; therein may lie a compelling justification for a common residential base to learning,
the seeds of what is called on many campuses today a "living-learning community." All of these
examples remind us that many of the foundational concepts and ideas in education today surely
have been considered before in the history of humankind, including ideas about how to build and
sustain community life.
It is out of this tradition of early monasticism that Benedict ofNursia emerged (480-537 A.D.).
He wrote a Rule for monastics which gathered various strands of the tradition that went before
him. To that he added his own good sense and moderation. The Rule of Benedict has served as the
defining document for a distinctive form of community life that has persisted for over 1500 years, a
powerful testament to the wisdom therein. What are the lessons of this Benedictine tradition of
community and what do they offer educators who seek to build communities of learning on college
and university campuses today?
the essence of Benedictine community
Implications of the monastic tradition for educators are best understood within the principal
features of communities established in that tradition. Thus we begin by articulating what we believe
to be the essence of the Benedictine tradition by focusing on six foundational values embedded in
such communities, and identified here in their original Latin nomenclature:
Traditio et Regula

The importance of lived and documented experience.
Stabilitas

Importance of commitment-to this community, to this place.
Conversatio

Importance of commitment and openness to change and growth,
becoming more and more what we are called to be.
Ora et Labora

The importance of the interior and exterior life, their integration and balance.
Obedientia

The importance of listening to others and giving over self to others in trust.
Hospitalitas

The importance of being open to those from without.
While these values have characterized Benedictine communities of men and women since the sixth
century, we believe they also offer a unique and helpful prescriptive "ecology of humankind" (Chittister, 26), with currency for today's challenges of building community on college and university
campuses. Whether in a classroom, residence hall, student organization, or department office, we
suggest that the building of community is essential for carrying out the mission of teaching and
learning in higher education. We consider that challenge now in the context of each of these values.

traditio et regula
Traditio et Regula ("Tradition and Rule") emphasizes the importance of both the lived {tradition) and documented (rule) experience of community members. All communities have texts (or
rules) which document their way of life; communities need defining texts, those written documents
which create identity, name core values, and serve as guides to stay on course. But texts, by nature,
are fixed in time and place unless living communities hold and interpret them. Thus, tradition,
often captured in story and communicated by community storytellers, remembers how the text was
adapted to meet the needs of the past.
In coming to know and understand any community it is important to ask: What is the tradition or custom here? What is the rule? What do these traditions and rules say about this community? Who knows them and how do they come to know them? Who is responsible for the stories?
How are new members introduced to these traditions and rules? What is the relationship between

the lived and documented experience here? Although traditions and rules assure a consistency of
community life over time, they must also evolve to accommodate changing conditions and circumstances. How do members reflect on these traditions and rules for new meanings and adaptations?
How are they maintained? How are they changed and renewed? The importance of tradition and
rule in communities is that they define the myriad properties of community culture as reflected in
artifacts, perspectives, values, and assumptions. These properties shape community ethos as they
are, in turn, shaped by members who sustain them.
stabilitas
Stabilitas ("stability") underscores the importance of commitment in community life, commitment to a specific community of people in a particular place. Benedict observed that, among those
in the early centuries who professed a commitment to monastic life, were hermits (or anchorites),
those who sought the solitude of the desert, sarabaites, who "take their own will and desire and
make that their law," and vagabonds who "never settle down" being "slaves to their own will and
instincts." Key to the Benedictine way of life are the cenobites, those who choose to live in monastic
groups and serve under a Rule and an Abbot. This commitment to stability is observed and reinforced through communal prayer, common table, the work of the community, service for the
common good, and common recreation. Its symbols are found in common dress and vocabulary,
defined space and schedule, and community rank established only by date of entry into the community. Community virtues emphasize the primacy of the common good and respect and love for
others; community sins include anger and division, murmuring and complaining, and acedia, that
is, the temptation to "give up the project." Correction of faults is exercised publicly through chapter
meetings and various degrees of exclusion of those who refuse repeatedly to reform.
In the present age of career "strategies and moves," places and positions too often become
only means to other ends. Success is defined as "moving up and out" to the next level, while failure
is presumed in "being stuck" at any current place or level. Communication and relationships are
guarded with political acumen for fear of forfeiting an "opportunity" that might come along. The
challenge of Stabilitas is to recognize that we each must commit to some place where we can become
ourselves in the presence of others, a place that serves as an end itself rather than just a means. The
Rule of Benedict states "that if you want to be holy, stay where you are in the human community
and learn from it. Learn patience. Learn wisdom. Learn unselfishness. Learn love" (Chittister, 33).
Indeed, successful communities are dependent upon members' continued affiliation, through thick
and thin, out of a sense of commitment to something larger than individual interests and needs,
namely, the community. Attrition threatens the fabric of community and saps the motive and energy
of those who remain, ultimately endangering the very existence of the community.
The challenge of Stabilitas is also about the sense of ownership, pride, stewardship and responsibility for place. In any setting claiming an identity of community, it is important to ask: What is
the commitment level here to "stay the course"? To this institution? To this department? To this
office? To this position? To these colleagues? What supports such commitment here? What threatens
it? What virtues characterize this community? What vices denigrate it? How do we invoke and nurture commitment? How do we recognize and celebrate it? Ultimately, Stabilitas assures that members remain committed to the community, in spite of the forces that divide it.
conversatio
Perhaps like no other value of Benedictine life, Conversatio stands at the center of community.
It is about the importance of commitment and openness to change and growth, becoming more and
more, in the presence of others, what an individual is called to be. Rooted in "convertere," meaning
to turn around, to change, Conversatio makes many things possible in community life. Without it
the "school of the Lord's service," as Benedict himself characterized monastic community, is closed.
Conversatio includes both a commitment to change as well as a commitment to "living the life,"
whatever form that may take. Key to this orientation to change, according to Benedict, is the virtue

of humility, without which no learning can take place. Humility is truth-seeking; it is reality based;
it can admit faults and sins; and it seeks to integrate the inside and the outside. Humility recognizes
the other as a person; it is oriented to "that love of God, when perfect, casts out fear."
In reflecting on this aspect of community life, it is important for members to consider: How
do we change and grow? What is our commitment to self renewal and learning? Do we resist change
in self? Do we let others around us change and grow? What are the opportunities? What are the
risks? What changes would benefit self? What changes would serve the needs of the community?
Such questions underscore the dynamic nature of communities. They are always a work in progress.
Such questions also remind us of the importance of growth and change in each member of the community. In light of this, opportunities for continued learning and development become more than a
luxury afforded when resources are plentiful. Such opportunities are, in fact, the key to growth and
change.
ora et labora
With the focus on Ora et Labora we begin to understand the means with which Benedict
invites us to pursue a commitment to a tradition and rule, a place, and a process of growth called
community. Ora et labora is Benedict's job description for community living. Literally translated as
"Prayer and Work," it emphasizes the importance of the interior and exterior dimensions of life,
their balance and integration. "Prayer without the creative and compassionate potential of work or
work without the transcending quality of prayer, lists heavily to the empty side of life" (Chittister,
112). Benedictine community life, in many ways, entails learning to live in balance with daily
paradox. Building community is an attempt to find a middle path, a way of discretion and wisdom
which is able to hold opposing forces in dynamic tension. Individual is balanced by community; separation by inclusion; following by leading; equality by status; weakness by strength; obedience by
authority; inside by outside; quiet by speaking; justice by mercy; correction by care; respect by love;
practical by ideal; stability by change; and reflection by action. For Benedict, the Rule applies equally
to all members of the community; at the same time each member is also a potential exception to it.
Somewhere in the middle is wisdom.
Balance means living both the interior and exterior life as one. Thus, communities in this tradition must make provisions for the interior life, time to think, to reflect, to wonder and to imagine.
Do we honor a place where members can experience self in quiet? Of special significance in Benedictine communities is the practice of prayerful reading, "lectio," as it is called. This is the time to
experience quiet, to read for more than understanding, to become one with words. In terms of the
exterior life, how is time appropriated to complete our work? How do we understand our craft, our
role, our service? What aspects of our work sustain the community. Of special significance,
according to Benedict, are: (a) service to the community and (b) service to the sick "before all things
and above all things." Many a so-called community has dissolved over simple questions like: "Who
takes out the garbage?" If any community is to survive, all members must contribute to all tasks,
from the menial to the majestic. Finally, to coordinate the myriad logistics of community work and
to "provide for the whole community like a parent," as Benedict prescribes, a manager should be
chosen "who is wise and mature in character, well balanced and not voracious."
obedientia
Obedientia emphasizes the importance of listening carefully and giving over of self to others
in trust. Like humility, however, obedience is a dangerous virtue; it is easily abused. But also like
humility, there is no learning without obedience. To be a student is to obey the teacher. This obedience can be servile or empowering. The rule of Benedict emphasizes the relationship between listening and obeying. As also in Hebrew and Greek, the Latin word "to obey" (obedire) also means
"to listen." Likewise the words for listening (auscultare and audire) can also mean "to obey." Thus,
in the very first line of his Rule, Benedict invites us to: "Listen .... to the instruction of your teacher.
Listen carefully with the ear of your heart. Freely accept and faithfully fulfill the counsel of a loving
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parent so that you may return by the hard work of obedience to God" (Prologue 1-2). To hear with
the ear of the heart means entrusting oneself to the teacher. The Rule sets a very high standard for
the teacher and in particular for the abbot, who is the primary teacher of the community.
If one had to identify the special genius of Benedict, many would point to the chapters on the
abbot (chapters 2 and 64). Benedict's prescription for those in charge include wisdom, balance and
discretion, "so that the strong may have something to strive for and the weak nothing to dismay
them." The exercise of authority is always in the service of community, vision, and forming individuals, "more by deeds than words." Benedict instructs the community leader to show no favoritism,
"let mercy triumph over justice," and "adapt to the character and intelligence of each person,"
seeking "rather to be loved than to be feared." Love creates the possibility for speaking the truth.
The one in charge does not bear the whole weight. In matters of importance, seek counsel from
everyone, even the youngest. Finally Benedict emphasizes that obedience must be mutual: members
of a community must obey each other by listening to everyone and acting on that.
Embracing such an understanding of community means asking: How do we listen to, remain
present to, and attend to others in our community? Peers and colleagues? To those who exercise
authority over us? To those who are accountable to us as subordinates? Obedientia connects the disparate pieces of community to a common frame. Without it, arrogance and individuality prevail;
with it, humility and openness to learning thrive. In Benedictine communities, the hours of the day,
for work and prayer, are marked by the ringing of bells. Celebrations and special events, joyous
feasts and memorials, and even the very moment of a community member's death, are all occasions
for sacred tolls. In such a community, listening carefully is more than symbol; it is essential.
hospitalitas
If anything characterizes Benedictine communities as special places it would be the value
placed on Hospitalitas, or "Hospitality." Hospitalitas stresses the importance of being open to those
from beyond the community, and it does so for very good reasons. The same forces that build community insulate it as well. A community that focuses exclusively on inward agendas risks disconnection from its environs. In isolation, new perspectives and ideas soon fade, and in the long run, members experience the inevitable consequences of communal atrophy and dysfunction. Hospitalitas is
an important antidote to such outcomes, and in Benedictine communities it serves two functions:
first, receiving others "as Christ himself" provides an opportunity to practice works of charity and
compassion all members are called to do as Christians ("I was a stranger and you took me in." Matt.
25 :35); and second, an atmosphere of hospitality encourages others to visit and spend time with the
community, potentially offering insight and critique, in effect, holding up a mirror to the community in the service of its change and growth. Communities committed to Hospitalitas reflect regularly on these concerns: How do we invite and welcome others to our community? What signs,
symbols, and customs create a sense of welcome? What creates distance between our community
and those beyond it? Although we may explicitly "welcome" others, our signs, symbols, and customs can implicitly send messages more powerful and, at times, in conflict with our intentions. Artifacts of community culture send messages long before spoken words. In that respect, how do we
welcome others who may differ by status, culture, power, or wealth?
Welcoming others is of such significance to Benedictine communities to warrant the special
appointment of a "guest master" or "porter" in "a room near the entrance so that visitors will
always find him there to answer them." Noteworthy in this prescription is Benedict's advice to
appoint a member who has longevity in the community, in Benedict's words, "a sensible old man
who knows how to take a message, and whose age keeps him from roaming about," for such a
person is also most likely to have a more complete understanding of and appreciation for the community's culture and ethos (its Traditio et Regula), having already lived it for an extended period of
time. Thus, communities in this tradition need to attend to formal provisions and structures for
welcoming others. Who is the community's guest master? The institutional host? The call to Hospitalitas defines the behavior of individual members as well. How accessible are we to others in the

community? How do we handle interruptions in our work? How do we demonstrate a sense of
caring to others? Ultimately the intent of Hospitalitas is to create a place where members can thrive
in an atmosphere of openness, accessibility and care. In Benedictine life this is both a practical virtue
as well as a moral mandate.
implications for higher education
What meaning do these ideas have for the goal of building community on college campuses?
In considering this question, it is helpful to think in terms of the many functions and services we
provide for in a typical institution. There are those services and functions whose primary mission is
to introduce and to facilitate newcomers (whether students, faculty, staff, or visitors) to the institution (e.g., admissions, enrollment management, orientation, financial aid, student union, bookstore, grounds keeping, physical plant, staff development, information office, freshman seminar
program). These are services, functions, programs, and places labeled "Entering," to reflect the fact
that this is the time period in which they are typically first encountered. Second, there are those we
call "Enculturating," whose primary mission is to engage students in the process and work of living
and learning within an institution. These might include residence life, student activities and organizations, counseling, career planning, discipline, campus ministry, cooperative learning, academic
advising, health and wellness, athletics and recreation, multicultural affairs, learning services, and
special services. Third are those labeled "Exiting," (e.g., placement, alumni/ae and development,
commencement, continuing education) which serve primarily to culminate students' experiences
and reorient them toward their next steps beyond the institution.
Although each of the six Benedictine values is applicable at any point along this sequence of
functions and services, the following model suggests that there are points where certain aspects of
community building can be used to define and focus the primary mission of these functions, services
and programs:
Entering: The primary mission of these services, functions, programs, and places is to introduce and

to facilitate newcomers (students, faculty, staff, visitors) to the institution (e.g., admissions, enrollment management, orientation, financial aid, student union, bookstore, grounds keeping, physical
plant, staff development, information office, freshman seminar program).
*Hospitalitas
*Traditio et Regula
*Stabilitas
Enculturating: The primary mission of these services, functions, programs, and places is to engage

students in the process and work of living and learning within the institution (e.g., residence life, student activities and organizations, counseling, career planning, discipline, campus ministry, cooperative learning, academic advising, health and wellness center, athletics and recreation, multicultural
affairs, learning services, special services)
*Conversatio
*Ora et Labora
*obedientia
Exiting: The primary mission of these services, functions, programs, and places is to culminate and

reorient students' experiences toward their next step beyond the institution (e.g., placement,
alumni/ae and development, commencement, continuing education)
*Conversatio
*Stabilitas
*Hospitalitas
For example, at the point of entry it is very important to emphasize the hospitable features of the
institution to newcomers. From the physical environment to the programs and services that orient
students to campus life, first impressions are important to the formation of positive attitudes about
an institution and they create a critical prelude to matriculation and retention. This is the time to
highlight Hospitalitas so that students acquire a basic sense of comfort and homeplace in their new
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setting. In the first few months of campus experience (even long before that, through various media
and recruitment materials) it is crucial that students begin to learn about various aspects of campus
culture-the artifacts, customs, traditions, values and assumptions that distinguish an institution, in
general, and the immediate living environment, in particular. It is crucial, at this time, that Traditio
et Regula become important sources of information to be communicated to newcomers with opportunities to explore their meaning and implications.
Toward that end many institutions have recently initiated successful Freshman Seminar programs with impressive results. Also, the point of entry is an important time to invoke a commitment
to being a student at a particular institution. Formal occasions such as convocation and orientation
ceremonies present key opportunities for communicating the nature of institutional expectations
and for exacting a purposeful decision to participate fully in the campus community. Thus, Stabilitas becomes a primary focus of institutional efforts at this stage. However, recommitting to "stay
the course" becomes an ongoing challenge for many students, as bouts of homesickness, unfulfilled
expectations, adjustments to unfamiliar experiences and circumstances, disappointments of academic performance, and confusion about goals and purposes jeopardize their sense of stability and
direction. For many, the end of the first six weeks is a critical turning point, as are the conclusions of
the first semester and the first year. The decision to remain at an institution needs to be purposefully
recognized and nurtured throughout this phase.
Enculturating functions, services, and programs move students beyond the novice phase of
institutional life to consider more carefully and deeply the import of having chosen to become a student at a particular college. Thus they engage students in the core processes of living and learning in
the institution. From a Benedictine perspective, three aspects shape these processes for students: (a)
their openness to change and growth (Conversatio); (b) their integration and balance of the interior
and exterior life (Ora et Labora); and (c) their willingness to listen and to give themselves over to
others in trust (Obedientia). These are the defining processes of living the life of a student in such a
community. Failure to acquire the fundamentals of any of these can be detrimental to an individual's
experience as well as to the overall fabric of community. University success seminars, mentoring
opportunities, wellness programs, and basic attending skills workshops are all examples of initiatives which can be implemented to serve such ends.
Finally, at the point of exiting an institution, it becomes important to reinforce once again
graduates' continuing commitment to growth and change as a lifelong process (Conversatio); to
remind them of the reasons why they chose the particular institution as their place to live and learn,
encouraging them, in particular, to remain loyal alums and lifelong friends (Stabilitas); and to let
them know that they are always welcome to return to a place that has meant much to them in their
transition to the next phase of life (Hospitalitas). Rather than terminating relationships, the mission
of these functions, services, and programs is to renew and sustain relationships with those who have
become part of the institution's communal history.
conclusion
In the most recent, comprehensive review of the Rule, undertaken to honor the sesquimillennial observance of Benedict's birth, the authors noted that "It seems to be a perennial temptation in
all ages to imagine that contemporary culture represents the apogee of human development" (Fry,
150). We believe that our current era is no exception, with respect to building communities on college campuses. Although current discussions of community in the literature are illuminating (e.g.,
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1990; Palmer, 1987; Spitzberg &
Thorndike, 1992; and Tierney, 1993), we must also consider that generations before may have
addressed many of the fundamental prescriptions we seek. We agree that "The insights of past generations [can] provide a kind of matrix within which new experiences of life can be organized and
assimilated" (Fry, 146), and we have presented these ideas as one matrix within which educational
institutions can organize and assimilate the design of campus communities. We conclude as others
have argued, that ''A wisdom tradition is in constant need of being rethought and reexperienced if it
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is to remain alive. It needs to be expressed anew in contemporary language, contemporary situations and contemporary behavior" (Fry, 149). Thus, we challenge educators to reexperience this
Benedictine tradition, nurturing the wisdom of its Rule, as the Rule has nurtured and sustained
countless generations before. After all, Benedictine spirituality "deals with the issues facing us
now-stewardship, relationships, authority, community, balance, work, simplicity, prayer, and spiritual and psychological development" (Chittister, 15). This is an agenda for building campus
learning communities.
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Seeking Common Ground:

models for understanding and negotiating religious diversity

Judith A. Berling
In part two of this essay, which was originally delivered as the 1997 Warren Rubel Lecture on Christianity and Higher Learning at Christ College, the author moves on from her description of several less helpful
models for understanding religious diversity to uncover a more appropriate one. The essay concludes by
reflecting on the relation of this search for an appropriate model to Christian higher learning, asking "Why is it
important that Christians study and understand other religions? What is at stake for us?"
-The Editor

A.

alternative modelo a house with many moms
To develop a more fitting model, we may need to come in from the fields {the out-of-doors)
and find shelter under a roof, more specifically a house.
The potential of this image as a model for negotiating religious diversity was brought home to
me (if you will forgive the pun) in a book by Linda Moody. Moody rediscovers the image of a house
in the writing of a secular feminist theorist, Rosemarie Tong. Tong develops her image as an attempt
to transcend the bitter divisions within the feminist camp. She writes:
It is a major challenge to contemporary feminism to reconcile the pressures for diversity and difference with those for integration and commonality. We need a home in which everyone has a room of
their own, but one in which the walls are thin enough to permit a conversation, a community of
friends in virtue, and partners in action.

Tong's image builds on Virginia Woolf's famous notion that some private space, "a room of her
own," is a necessity for the development of woman's consciousness and voice. It is a fitting image
for religious communities as well. For the vast majority of religious folk, the distinctive "space" of
their community provides a much needed venue of worship, prayer, reflection, and conversation
which develops their religious identity and their sense of a "place in the world." While we seek
common ground on which to meet and to celebrate one another, we also need to know who we are
and to affirm our communities of choice.
As Linda Moody builds on Tong's image, she notes that white middle class folks, in particular,
tend to overstress the need for privacy; we are a bit cautious about "mixing it up." She warns,
It is not necessary for us to have our room completely decorated and pictures hung on the wall before
venturing out [into the common spaces]; in fact, it is critical that we move back and forth from our
room to common living spaces even as we deepen our own wellspring.

Our metaphors
can enable or cripple
our chances for
making the most
of religious diversity.
Professor Berling
opens the door

United States white middle class assumptions of privacy in the home have been developed to an
unusual point in the second half of this century. In most cultures and classes, indeed in most times in
US history, homes were multigenerational and included large groups of family and even non-family
members. Privacy was minimal; spaces were shared, doors remained open. Moody suggests in a
very thought-provoking way that the development of spacious nuclear family homes with a wealth
of private spaces has compromised the development of our skills for sharing and opening ourselves
to others. We have become intensely private people, and the development of computer technologies
may be exacerbating this trend despite its vaunted "interconnectedness."
Tong's and Moody's image of the house can, I believe, be enriched by linking it to the biblical

to a
winsome image.

image in John 14:2 of the "father's house with many rooms." However, this would entail an
expanded reading of this biblical passage.
Generally our reading of John 14:2 is solely individualistic, seeing the "Father's house" as full
of rooms for individuals, and the saying as assurance that we, in effect, won't have missed the
housing deadline-there will be a room available for us personally. In the gospel context, Jesus is
assuring his disciples that, although he is going away, he will come again for them, and there will be
a place for them.
The question, however, might be put this way: how capacious is God's house? How wide is
God's love? Is it possible that the "many rooms" in God's house will also have places for those who
have found paths to God different from our own? Perhaps in another wing of the house? We cannot
know for certain, but as a Christian, what I have glimpsed of the steadfastness and vastness of God's
love assures me that it is always "beyond my comprehension," far vaster than my heart or my imagination can reach.
Assuming that God's house has many rooms, there will be room for my particular Episcopalian sense and sensibility, but also rooms for many others. And we as Christians have sound warrant to believe that the reach of God's love will be very great indeed. We are all likely to meet, in
God's capacious house, folk we did not expect to see there.
Moody's development of the image of the house of many rooms moves beyond the largeness
of the house to note that the very image of a house also suggests common spaces: God's love not
only loves us as we are and invites us to be our authentic selves (and thus provides us a "room of our
own") but also invites us to ever broader love in the "common rooms" of this Divine complex.
Moody's move stimulates me to develop the image of a large house even further. Consider the
common spaces of a house: they serve multiple purposes. In the kitchen and dining room, we prepare food either for our families, or to invite others to eat with us. The dining room of God's capacious house is extremely important, since commensality, the invitation to share food, is the most
ancient and venerated form of hospitality, of entering into relationship with the stranger. In living
rooms or parlors, we entertain, converse, or hold meetings. In sewing rooms, computer rooms, or
game rooms we come together for common purpose or activities. We meet informally daily in the
hall, the kitchen, and the backyard. In attics and basement are items stored from the past, not often
used or perhaps forgotten, that nonetheless may be recovered for our own group or lent to another.
The common spaces of the house are meeting grounds, places of interaction or mutual hosting.
They can provide chance encounters (for those who happen to be in or pass through the same space
at the same time) or intentional meetings or celebrations. But in a house (as we understand it in
Western culture), there is also refuge from common space, our own room where we follow our own
ways.
reflections
The image of a house with many rooms seems well suited as a Western Christian model for
understanding and negotiating religious diversity. It offers some "common ground," but also the
assurance of private spaces in which to preserve the particularities of our various traditions. It does
not challenge us to "become one" or transcend our particularities, only to meet one another in
God's love.
The image of the house, however, makes clear that our "own rooms" are connected to the
common spaces under one roof (in the Biblical sense, the roof is God's love); it challenges our
instincts to see only the private and particular and to refuse to envision or enter the common ground.
The image of the Father's house with many rooms is offered as a Christian, Biblically rooted
image which may open up our Western Christian imaginations to see new possibilities for living
with religious neighbors. It is not promising as a base for interfaith dialogue. Not all cultures have
the same image of a house, nor are the patterns of interaction in domestic complexes universal. The
image may be useful for developing in Western Christians a new model for envisioning their theological relationship with those who seek God through other faiths.
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In other words, although the model has promise, there is a great deal of work to be done.
Many Christians will have to reflect on and pray for ways to implement this or some other appropriate model for understanding and negotiating religious diversity.
diversity and Christian higher learning
There is a considerable distance between the present Christian stance toward religious neighbors and a genuine yet faithful Christian inclusivity (or at least a generous hospitality). This distance
gives Christian higher learning an urgent mission for our times.
Christian higher learning is not only important; it is crucial to the vitality of the Christian
community. Christian thought and reflection cannot be left to the professional theologians and
ordained clergy. They are fine and dedicated folks (some of my very best friends are professional
theologians and clergy), but they cannot carry the "priesthood" for us all. The church is, after all, a
priesthood of all believers. The problem is that too many Christians resist bringing their minds as
well as their hearts and souls into the church. They either cling to childhood certainties or embrace
a skepticism which keeps them distanced and alienated from an engaged Christian faith. The priesthood of all believers invites us all to engaged theological reflection, to wrestling with the issue of
faith in our own day. (There is a wonderful poster in my local church which says: He came to save
us from our sins, not our minds.)
Christian higher learning can prepare us to be engaged theologians, to understand and reappropriate our traditions, to wrestle with the theological issues which face us individually and collectively. The first task is to be grounded in our own heritage and to reappropriate it in intellectually
and spiritually responsible terms. That, as I understand it, is key to the sophomore year at Christ
College, when a key theme is the nature and purpose of Christian theology.
I was pleased to note that in the junior year, Christ College students encounter broader perspectives: issues from other cultures, feminist and family issues, scientific and ethical issues, issues
from other religions. All of these challenge our presuppositions and broaden our horizons. They
help us to discern both the specific issues shaping our own location and values, and the fundamental
differences represented by those with other locations.
I want to argue, briefly, that religious and cultural difference are key here, particularly for
Christian higher learning. Since Christianity carries the historical burden of exclusivity, which was
used for many centuries to ignore or erase cultural differences among Christians, we need to reeducate our sensibilities to achieve a genuine and appropriate openness.
Religious difference offers encounter with another world-view, a radically different lens for
orienting oneself in the world and for generating meaning and value. The central teachings and
practices of each religion present that lens in powerful ways. To engage that very different represen-

tation of "the world" is to enter, however tentatively, into the world of another. All sorts of questions immediately arise: a) one struggles to see how the pieces of this different world fit together,
and why the valences are so different; b) one notices things "not present" in one's familiar world
and thus reflects on "what difference does this absence make?"
I spoke above of religious and cultural difference, since there is a tendency in American popular culture to see religious teachings and practices as a great buffet from which one can pick and
choose isolated bits (as in a cafeteria or a salad bar). We take a practice from Buddhism, a myth from
Native Americans, a story from Chuang Tzu, a breathing technique from Yoga. Such selective borrowing has been practiced in the encounter of religions from the beginning of time; the difference
today is that our global interconnectedness makes so many "bits and pieces" available to us. While
the cafeteria approach has its uses, it does not accomplish what I believe is vital in Christian higher
learning: it does not force us to encounter the integrity and the cultural embeddedness of the beliefs
and practices in the lives of those for whom these are defining traditions. It does not challenge our
presuppositions, bring fresh insights, or expand our horizons.
Expanding horizons is important because it stretches our minds and hearts so that we can
begin to appreciate more deeply what is important, what is at stake, in the lives and the sensibilities
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of our religious neighbors. When we meet our neighbors in the schoolroom, the workplace, our
families (through webs of friendship or intermarriage), and our communities, we are more alert to
the experiences, values, and sensibilities they bring. We can welcome them as guests in our lives,
and we will be comfortable as guests in theirs. We will be ready to conceive of ourselves as sharing
space with them, of forming a larger community under the God of love.
Understanding of and familiarity with other faiths can, in my experience, deepen our own
Christian faith. Let me speak from my own experience. First, my study of other religions has helped
me to see how my Christian heritage is positioned within the religious possibilities of humankind. I
understand what is distinctive about my faith and why that is important to me, and I also understand what my faith shares with or offers to other traditions around the world. Just as I as a person
share some experiences and ideas in common with my friends, and have some experiences and ideas
which differ from them, so it is with my friends from other traditions.
Second, knowledge of other traditions has made me more articulate about my Christian beliefs
and values. Just as I often clarify my position on any issue through conversation and friendly debates
with colleagues, so thinking about Christian issues and values in the light of other faiths helps
sharpen my sense of my own beliefs.
Third, study of other faiths has helped me to rediscover in Christianity strands of belief and
practice which have enriched my Christian life: my understanding of options for prayer and reflection, my appreciation of the needs for rhythms of withdrawal/quiet and engagement/activism, my
sense of genuine Christian hospitality have all been sparked by encounters with other religions.
Last and by no means least, my understanding of my role as a teacher who makes room for
students to discover for themselves has been profoundly enriched by reflection on the roles of
teachers/masters in many religious traditions.
In our increasingly interconnected world where the global is the local, and the local is the
global, we are, I am convinced, called as Christians to understand, appreciate, respect, and be good
neighbors to brothers and sisters of other faiths. Your studies at Christ College can prepare you for
this, and help you to see the relationship between faith and contemporary culture, which is both
global and religiously diverse.

f

works cited
Carter Heyward, Our Passion for Justice: Images of Power, Sexuality, and Liberation. New York:
Pilgrim Press, 1984.
Hans Kling and Julia Ching, Christianity and Chinese Religions. New York: Doubleday, 1989.
Mencius 3A:3; translated in Sources of Chinese Tradition, I: 95.
C.K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society: A Study of Contemporary Social Functions of Religion and
Some of the Historical Factors. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1967.

editor's note:
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of the Easter issue (in which Part I appears) or a reprint, at your request, and at no charge.
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Religion and Liberal Democracy:
reflections from the city of God

Kent Greenawalt

s t . Augustine wtote The City of God neady sixteen oentuties ago. The dasskal Roman Empi<e,
which by then was officially Christian, was in precipitous decline. No one had conceived of liberal
democratic societies rooted in principles of religious liberty. Do Augustine's thoughts have any relevance for the issues of law and political philosophy that trouble us now? The answer is "yes."
Although we would be ill served by seeking to apply all his recommendations for political life, his
profound insights about human nature and about the fundamental tasks of a political order can help
us evaluate how our society should resolve issues of church and state, religion and politics.
I shall discuss three intersections of government with religious beliefs and institutions. First,
should the state support religious groups? Second, should people who violate ordinary laws out of
religious conviction receive exemptions? Third, should people bring their religious convictions to
bear in public debates over what laws to adopt? The first two questions involve areas of constitutional law and legislative choice; the third question is mainly one of political philosophy, not law.
The deepest themes of The City of God can illuminate our understanding of these issues.

Living by faith
and living by law
may not collide
if we are
patient enough

deep themes and a critical cross current
The City of God contrasts a worldly city with a heavenly one. Members of the worldly city are
moved by greed, lust for domination, and pride; members of the heavenly city by love for God. The
primary task of civil government is to achieve a degree of earthly security. "[T]he earthly city which
does not live by faith seeks only an earthly peace, and limits the goal of its peace, of its harmony of
authority and obedience among citizens, to the voluntary and collective attainment of objectives
necessary to mutual existence" (St. Augustine, 464). The earthly city "has a finality of its own, it
reaches such happiness by sharing a common good as is possible when there are no goods but the
things of time to afford it happiness" (327). Members of the City of God live by faith; they serve
one another in charity. Augustine is careful not to identify the City of God with the visible church;
indeed, one of his major disagreements with the Donatists was over their ideal of a "pure" church.
Augustine regarded the Roman Catholic Church as inclusive, embracing many who were not actually saved. For Augustine, the members of the City of God, "wayfarers" in the world, are intermingled with members of the worldly city, and no one can identify just who they are. "Both of these
cities alike make use of temporal goods and both are equally affected by temporal ills-but how different they are in faith, how dissimilar in hope, how unlike in love. They will go on until they are to
be separated in the last Judgment, when each shall receive its appointed end .. . " (425). Before that
time, "as mortal life is the same for all, there ought to be common cause between the two cities in
what concerns our purely human living" (464).
Although Augustine, a man who greatly prized friendship, accepted the classical notion that
human beings are inherently social, he decisively rejected the classical conception that the purpose
of the state is to promote the good life. As Herbert Deane wrote,
The traditional view of the early Church that the state was an essential instrument for repressing the
consequences of sin and that it was not the vehicle by which men could attain true justice, true virtue, or
true happiness was thoroughly congenial to Augustine's own leading conceptions-the sinfulness of
human nature, salvation by unmerited divine grace, and the view that private property, slavery, and the
political and legal systems are punishments and remedies for the depraved condition of mankind after
the Fall. (10-11)
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The passages I have read comport with a civil state that provides benefits that people of diverse
religious views require, a state that stays away from matters of the spirit, for which it is incompetent. Surprisingly, this vision of political life is not so different from that of John Locke-a political
philosopher one does not commonly associate with Augustine. Locke had a more optimistic view of
human nature and was less disparaging of secular goods than Augustine, but his First Letter Concerning Toleration treats salvation as the most important human good, a good that cannot be trusted
to civil authorities (See Locke).
The following passage sums up the crucial cross current in The City of God. "We call those
Christian emperors happy who govern with justice .... We call them happy when they think of sovereignty as a ministry of God and use it for the spread of the true religion ... "(118). Augustine had
no illusion that persecution could directly produce true faith, but he had shifted from his earlier
view that imperial force should not be used against the Donatists. When he wrote this book, he
believed that civil coercion could help prevent the spread of heresy; he also thought that some
people who initially joined the Catholic Church out of fear later came to voluntary acceptance of
the faith. Like later defenders of physical force against heresy, Augustine, in a 408 letter, made reference to the parable found in Luke (xiv, 26-29), of the master instructing his servant to compel
strangers to come to his banquet. As Augustine conceived the crucial question, it was whether civil
authorities should promote the true faith. Locke and his French contemporary, Pierre Bayle, asked a
different question: should one endorse a principle that rulers enforce what they understand to be
the true faith? Locke and Bayle saw clearly that if all rulers acted on this principle, many rulers
would end up not enforcing the true religion, given widespread disagreement about what religion is
true. (Bayle, 41) Professor Deane speaks of a "fundamental contradiction" between Augustine's
general attitude toward the state and his final approval of legal punishment for heresy.
Since state use of coercive force to support any particular religion is unthinkable in our society,
this tension within Augustine may seem to have only antiquarian interest, but some people do now
seek milder forms of support for religion. They typically suppose that religion is of great intrinsic
importance for human life and that religion helps to promote virtuous citizens. They also suppose
that the government can contribute constructively to the religious life of its citizens. In what follows, I shall concentrate on the Augustine who conceives of the state as aiming at civil peace, governed by officials most of whom are residents of the worldly city; but I shall also attend to the
Augustine who urged Christian rulers to promote the true religion.
I. state support of religious groups
Should a modern liberal state support religious institutions? We need at once to make distinctions. As option a., the state could support particular religious groups or ideas because they are true
or because they provide more solid assistance to the state than competitors. As option b., the state
could support religious groups only insofar as they perform secular functions, such as running hospitals, with aid limited to the secular functions. Or, option c., the state could support religious
groups as such because they fall into some larger class of supported groups, leaving religious groups
free to use state assistance as they please.
First, on option a., if we were guided by Augustine's recommendation that rulers suppress
heresy, we would accept milder support of the true religion; but one of the basic premises of our
political order is that officials should not identify true religion. It is easy to see why. If officials are
mainly members of the earthly city, they cannot be trusted to make perceptive judgments about religion. With our diverse religious perspectives, struggle for the government's favor could produce
intense conflict, even if losers avoid persecution. The religious incompetence of officials and the
divisive effects of efforts to win endorsement are two extremely powerful reasons for religious liberty and nonestablishment.
What if officials picked religions to support according to their contribution to moral virtue and
political good health? That would not be much better. Religious life often does contribute to the
morality of citizens, and it both supports political institutions and serves as a check on tyrannical

18,19 The Cresset Trinity 11998 Special Issue Lilly Fellows Program in Humanities and the Arts

government. But the prospect of government endorsing particular religions because they perform
these functions especially well can fill no one with enthusiasm. Few seriously religious persons want
officials judging between religions on the basis of moral and political merit. Further, it would be
unseemly for endorsed religions to shift with the political winds, for Republican grants to the Christian Coalition to be followed by Democratic funding of the National Council of Churches. Aid to
groups on the basis of religious merit is barred by our Constitution, and few would have it otherwise.
A softer version of the position favoring aid does enjoy substantial support. The state could
assist religion in general, so long as it does not discriminate among denominations. As appealing as
this idea is to many people, it is at odds with a principle of nonsponsorship the Supreme Court has
developed for the religion clauses. And it is not finally defensible. Proponents often assert that the
Establishment Clause was originally seen as allowing non preferential assistance to Christian groups.
But the country is now much more diverse than it was then, and immigration keeps drawing more
non-Christians within our borders. We are still dominantly Christian in religious belief and practice,
but do we want to label all non-Christians as failing to follow religions the government endorses? I
hope not. A plausible proposal to aid all religions needs to include more than Christians. But how
can the government endorse religions with mutually incompatible beliefs? It might, of course, give
money to all religious groups or announce that religious practice is healthy; but government does
far better to refrain from endorsing religion. That, with minimal exceptions, is what the prevailing
principle of nonsponsorship requires.
Continuing to option b., we consider whether the state should be able to support secular functions of religious groups? In modern societies, governments do much that is beyond what Augustine
regarded as the core of state responsibilities. Given the pervasive concerns of many religions, a substantial overlap exists between their concerns and those of government. Since one way for the government to act is by supporting private endeavors, the state may finance private efforts to improve
personal and social life, by hospitals, adoption agencies, soup kitchens, and schools. If religious
groups provide these services, should they be given or denied assistance afforded other private
groups? If support assists the secular service, and criteria for support are based on the secular service, not religious soundness, the state may treat religious groups like other private providers. This
general principle, indeed, is rarely disputed.
Schools, however, present a special problem. One worry has been that general aid will promote a school's religious mission as well as secular service. A second worry is that because the vast
majority of private schools have been religious, and most of these are Roman Catholic, general aid
for private schooling would go overwhelmingly to religious groups. A third worry is that funding
for parochial schools will draw students away from public schools, crucial institutions in forging
unity out of cultural diversity. A final concern is that aid would generate divisive battles over
funding. The Supreme Court has referred to some of these factors in adopting a position that no
general aid may be given to religious schools. In recent decisions, however, the Court has emphasized the requirement that the state must be neutral between religious and nonreligious providers of
services. What it will say about assistance to religious schools as part of voucher programs is not
certain, but the prospects for approval look better than they have for a long time.
One point that has emerged in school aid cases has more general relevance. Any extensive
administrative intermixture between government and religious organization is highly undesirable,
even if the aim of the contact is to ensure that state support goes for secular services. When officials
become deeply involved in reviewing the efforts of religious organizations, the risks of insensitivity,
prejudice, and favoritism are great.
For option c., we must ask whether government support to religious groups may include direct
religious activities, so long as the government gives general aid to nonreligious groups on the same
basis? The Supreme Court has long spoken as if a state cannot make monetary grants to assist worship and other central religious activities; but recent decisions cast some doubt on this constitutional principle. In the most important case, the Court insisted that the University of Virginia must

help finance a student journal with a proselyting Christian message if it finances other student publications. Most Justices recognized a tension between a principle of no support and a principle of
neutrality; but Justice Thomas's concurrence argued that any neutral aid is acceptable (Rosenberger).
Imagine the following program: Congress becomes convinced, possibly as a result of reading
Roqert Putnam's now-famous analysis in "Bowling Alone," of the general value of private, intermediary organizations as seedbeds of moral virtue and democratic participation, and is worried about
declining involvement in these organizations. It decides to give grants to all private, nonprofit organizations according to membership, with no strings attached on the use of money. The idea is that
this will promote the health of our political life. It turns out that about half of the participation in
private groups in the United States is in churches, synagogues, mosques, etc. They receive half the
funds, and can use them to finance new facilities, costs of worship, or any other purposes. Since the
grants have no strings, little administrative supervision is needed. For churches, the economic benefit is like that they already receive from tax exemptions and deductions. Nonetheless, such a program is deeply troubling. Tax funds collected from everyone are paying for indisputably religious
activities, and churches will join other groups in seeking more funds for private intermediary organizations. If distance between government and religious institutions is usually desirable, this direct
support would be a large step in the wrong direction.
In thinking about government support for religious activities, we should take careful stock of
the vitality of religion in the United States as compared with much of Europe. Why is religious
belief and membership much higher here than in most European countries? Does state support, as it
exists in those countries, stultify religion? One cannot be sure, but I suspect the answer is yes. In
modern society, government may help religion most over the long run by not getting involved.
II. exemptions for religious claimants?
Should a liberal, democratic state create some exemptions from ordinary laws for people who
have strong religious reasons not to conform?
In its two most important cases, the Supreme Court has taken opposite positions about the
Free Exercise Clause. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, it said that a state cannot require Amish children to
attend school after the eighth grade if the Amish have a deep-seated religious understanding that
such education is spiritually harmful, and if they provide an alternative vocational education that
well prepares young men and women for Amish life. (Yoder) In Employment Division v. Smith,12
the Court said that for valid secular laws, religious claimants have no more right to disobey than
anyone else. Although using peyote lies at the very core of the worship services of the Native American Church, its members may not use peyote, if use is generally illegal. A court need not consider
whether any state interest warrants such a massive interference with worship; the church members
are out of luck. (Employment Division)
This striking reversal of basic free exercise principles dismayed most religious leaders and religion clause scholars. By an overwhelming vote, Congress reenacted the Yoder approach, under
which a state had to show a compelling interest in enforcement if a law would substantially burden
a person's exercise of religion. Otherwise, the religious claimant was exempted from the law's
application. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act applied to government at every political level.
In June, 1997, the Court held that Congress lacked authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to
reach state and local laws. (City of Boerne) In brief, Congress had no authority to expand rights the
Supreme Court had declared. The Court's opinion is murky about the law's application to federal
legislation and executive acts. Nothing in the Court's language indicates that Congress lacks power
to adopt such a law for the federal government or that state legislatures lack power to adopt such
laws within their own domains.
Although the Supreme Court has sharply reduced constitutionally compelled exemptions, it has
consistently said that legislatures may adopt specific accommodations to the free exercise of a religion. Without doubt, states may adopt explicit exceptions to the rules against peyote use for the
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Native American Church and similar churches, just as governments at all levels allowed use of wine
for communion when sales of alcoholic beverages were prohibited.
Perhaps Augustine's thought can help provide perspective on our constitutional law. For him,
religious concerns were the most important aspects of human existence. Secular states will sometimes make demands at odds with the guides of true religion. These conflicts will increase as the
domains of secular regulation expand. Is it not obviously desirable to minimize those conflicts with
feasible exemptions? Before we embrace that conclusion, we need to address two obstacles in Augustine's own thought and two matters he did not consider.
Regarding obedience to the state, Augustine had a virtually absolute view of when people
should obey the law. Only if believers were told to proclaim a false god or deny true religion should
they refuse to obey. Even then, they should passively refuse rather than resist authority. If people
obeyed to the extent Augustine recommended, few outright conflicts between secular and religious
demands would arise.
As a possible objection to exemptions, this claim about submission to authority is misconceived.
Our modern notions of deference do not fit Augustine's. Most people think unjust laws should be
disobeyed on some occasions; after Hitler and Stalin, few of us subscribe to near absolute obedience. Even more important, outright disobedience is not the main issue. The state should not
severely deprive people of religious freedom, even if they will (and should) submit to the state's
authority. The overriding concern for religious freedom does not depend on the attitude of believers
toward obeying laws.
More difficult to deal with is a second worry about Augustine's position: he was concerned
about the true religion, not religion in general. We have already seen that in modern conditions the
state cannot say what is the true religion. If exemptions are to be granted, they must go to religious
claimants generally (or to classes of claimants chosen in some manner other than the truth of their
religious understanding). We have three bases to move from Augustine's concern for true believers
to broader exemptions. First, among all the religious believers who will receive exemptions will be
believers in the true religion. They will receive exemptions that they would otherwise be denied.
Second, many of us now feel more modest than was Augustine in our ability to identify the true religion. We not only may doubt which particular religion has got things right, we believe many religions have some true insights. If we believe truth is dimly perceived and scattered, we would be very
hesitant to see exemptions restricted to one religion. In any event, our government cannot take the
view that one religion is right. The third basis for broader exemptions is that religious convictions
matter tremendously to many people, however close their opinions may be to ultimate truth.
Avoiding unnecessary conflicts in their perceived obligations is desirable.
A major concern about any judicial standard that depends on substantial burdens and compelling interests is that applying such a standard is very difficult. How do courts decide what burdens and state interests are great enough to tip the balance one way or the other? Further, someone
must say if a claimant's assertions are sincere; in occasional instances, judges have to decide whether
a sincere claim is "religious" or not. These worries about applying a flexible standard partly explain
the Supreme Court's shift from the approach of Yoder. If a legislature explicitly provides that members of the Native American Church may use peyote in worship services, the law's application is
clear for judges; but legislators then have had to make hard choices. Responsive to voters, legislators may care mainly about dominant religions. Dry counties will make exceptions for Christian use
of wine in worship; some states forbidding use of peyote may be less attentive to the minuscule
Native American Church. Leaving these choices to legislatures invites unfair discrimination through
neglect. That constitutional approach also invites discrimination in a stronger form-laws directly
targeted at unpopular religions. Such discrimination remains unconstitutional according to Supreme
Court doctrine; a city cannot forbid animal sacrifice if people are allowed to kill animals for all sorts
of other reasons. (Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye) However, courts often cannot determine why
legislatures acted as they did. Legislators can attack some hated religion under the facade of neutral,
secular purposes, and courts will accept their stated (acceptable) purposes. A free exercise test that

provides real protection for freedom of religion is difficult for courts to administer. Nevertheless,
the underlying value of religious liberty condemns the Supreme Court's insensitive withdrawal from
that task.
Even after these obstacles have been dealt with, there remains a serious worry about religious
exemptions in that they may be unfair to people with nonreligious claims of conscience. This is a
complex topic. For some religious claims-for example, not to work on Saturday or to receive
blood transfusions- it is hard to imagine nonreligous claims with the strength of the religious
claims. For other claims, such as not to kill in war, some individuals who are not religious in any
ordinary sense do have convictions with a strength like that of the convictions of religious pacifists.
Such individuals should be afforded a similar exception, either by constitutional right or legislative
decision. The issue of nonreligious conscience is delicate, but the solution is not to refuse all exemptions. That "solution" does not help those with nonreligious conscientious claims; they are not
going to feel much better in knowing that religious claimants will also go to jail.
In sum, the critical importance of religion in people's lives, a central premise of all Augustine
wrote, argues strongly in favor of exemptions for sincere religious claimants from the application of
some otherwise valid laws. No objection we have examined calls for a contrary conclusion.
III. religious convictions and politics
My third subject is the relation between religious belief and practice and our society's political
and legal life. Should citizens and officials rely on their religious understandings in debating and
resolving political problems? (What follows is a brief account of views I have developed more fully
in Private Consciences and Public Reasons, 1995.)
Think of some recent issues before Congress. Should it try to forestall the advent of human
cloning? Should it reduce the capital gains tax? Should it propose a constitutional amendment about
abortion? Should it expand medical insurance? Should it provide the death penalty for serious federal crimes? Should it accept or reject same-sex marriage (so far as it can influence that)? Many citizens believe that their religious perspectives speak to these issues. This is strikingly true about abortion, same-sex marriage, and capital punishment. People's religions also influence their notions of
what society owes its least fortunate members and of the acceptable gap between rich and poor.
Someone might say, for example, "the Bible, as exemplified particularly by the parable of the Good
Samaritan, teaches us God's wish that we love our neighbors; that obligation must be fulfilled by
greater aid to the poor." Should people bring religious arguments into the political forum or keep
them out? I shall first summarize more extreme positions, and clarify what is not at issue. I shall
then present my own position.
Some people believe, for example, that religion should be excluded from politics. They claim
that in pluralist liberal democracies, political decisions should be based on shared premises of liberal democracy and on methods of justification that are accessible to all citizens. Whatever the
exact components of religious understandings, citizens do not share any single religious perspective,
and none rests on methods of justification that are accessible in the required way. Religious belief
depends partly on faith, personal experience, and distinctive tradition. "Logical" arguments alone
will not persuade outsiders to embrace a religious view. Religious perspectives may enrich cultural
understandings as well as personal lives, but the state should not coerce citizens unless it has reasons
that have force for all of them. Since religious reasons do not have such force, they do not belong in
democratic politics. Their exclusion is required by fairness and political stability. Neither citizens
nor officials should rely on religious reasons as they discuss and determine political issues. One
might think of this exclusive position as a kind of extreme embodiment of Augustine's idea that religious and nonreligious citizens can unite in achieving the requisites of a common social life.
This "exclusive" position concerns politics, not broader public culture. It does not insist that
religion belongs in a private, wholly nonpublic sphere. Second, the position does not claim that
people can be wholly uninfluenced by their religious understandings. People should not rely on
religious reasons when they discuss political issues in public and they should attempt to develop
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their views without reference to those reasons. What the "exclusive" position urges is "self-exclusion." It does not propose punishing or silencing those who make religious arguments. People
should voluntarily refrain from making religious arguments because these arguments do not fit with
how liberal democracies should work.
The competing "inclusive" position suggests that citizens and officials may rely on the sources
of understanding they trust most. This position resonates with Augustine's view that religious
understanding is of overarching significance. If a respected religious authority, or a divine text, or a
personal sense of God tells someone that society should help the poor, she should feel free to rely
on that for her judgments about medical insurance. Shared premises and methods of justification
fail to resolve many political issues in a society as diverse as our own. Fairness consists in everybody
relying on what they think is most convincing. A democracy will be healthiest if religious arguments are part of political discourse. The inclusive position need not claim that every ground for a
political position is appropriate. Some grounds may be contrary to premises of liberal democracy.
We now suppose that racism and other denials of equal worth fall into this category. But religion has
never been so regarded in our country. From the beginning, religious belief and practice have been
thought fully compatible with the underpinnings of our political order.
Let me recapitulate four matters that are not seriously at issue, but are sometimes confused
with what is. The fundamental dispute is not over whether: (1) justifications that genuinely conflict
with basic liberal democratic premises belong in liberal democratic politics; (2) religious belief and
practice should be purely private, (3) people's religious convictions will influence their politics to
some degree; (4) the law should forbid people from expressing religious premises in political discourse.
My analysis of this subject differs from Augustine's writings in an important way. He started
with a particular overarching view-his understanding of Christianity-and examined its implications. Outside the context of this paper, with its reflection of Augustinian views, I mainly attempt
to do "detached" political philosophy that does not rely on any particular religious (or other overarching) view about the nature of human life. This section of the paper mainly folllows that
approach. I hope, of course, that my comments will appeal to those who hold diverse religious
views. There is nothing in this detached approach to political philosophy that necessarily leads to
one conclusion or another about political discourse and judgments. That is, one might adopt an
approach that itself does not rest on any religious view and arrive at an exclusive, inclusive, or intermediate position about the place of religious grounds in politics. (Similarly, one who begins from
underlying religious premises might arrive at any of the three positions.)
I am focusing here on uses of religious grounds to support political measures that do not
impose a religion on others. This requires a moment of explanation. If a government forbids all
religious practice except that according to Islam or Catholicism, the law involves an unacceptable
imposition of religion. The same is true about class prayer in public schools; it is wrong because of
what it does, not because people may have religious reasons for supporting it. But abolition of capital punishment, assistance to the poor, and many other pieces of legislation might be based on religious grounds without imposing religious views on anyone. It is these instances I want to discuss.
Each of the two basic positions about using religious grounds is strongly attractive. On examination, we can see that the strength of the competing arguments varies with people's political roles.
I want to defend a more nuanced, intermediate position for the United States at the end of the twentieth century.
Before presenting my own approach, I want to mention two other intermediate positions.
According to the first, views that are open, not too dogmatic and sectarian, play a useful role in politics. Views that leave no room for dialogue do not belong. The problem with this position is that
self-exclusion is at stake. Most people don't label their own views narrow and dogmatic; even if
they do, they won't think it is fair for them to refrain from relying on religion when their liberal,
perhaps heretical, brothers and sisters can do so. A different intermediate position is taken by John
Rawls in Political Liberalism. Rawls would sharply restrict the place of religious and other overar-

ching views in resolving issues about constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice, but he
believes that "comprehensive" views may be used more directly for ordinary political issues. They
also support the basic premises of liberal democracy as part of an overlapping consensus. (For my
critique of this approach see Private Consciences and Public Reasons, n. 16 supra at 106-20, as well
as "Religious Expression in the Public Square," 1996.)
My approach distinguishes advocacy and public justification from grounds of judgment; it
also distinguishes officials from ordinary citizens.
Most people would find it very hard to exclude deep religious convictions from political judgments. They cannot disentangle what they believe on religious grounds from what they might
believe if they relied only on shared techniques of understanding. They can, however, speak without
reference to religious convictions. I have never heard a specifically Christian, Jewish, or atheist
argument for a decision of our faculty. Yet, I doubt that colleagues try rigorously to remove the
threads of their religious understandings about the nature of society and education for a profession
when they deliberate on legal education.
People are aware if others make arguments from explicit religious premises; they can tell if
restraint on their own part is matched. They can never be sure if others are purging their silent
deliberations of religious influence. Such uncertainty is a shaky foundation for restraint that should
be reciprocal.
Consider some differences between officials and ordinary citizens. Officials have a lot more
to do with the law that gets made and applied than do citizens; citizens greatly outnumber officials.
Officials frequently make judgments and offer reasons that do not include all that is relevant to
them personally. Citizens less often practice such restraint. For officials to practice restraint about
religious bases impinges much less on a population's religious liberty than for citizens to do so.
Official restraint has more effect on the quality of political life. If any self-exclusion is justified, it is
self-exclusion for officials in their public statements. That is the core of my position.
Among officials we can divide roughly between those who apply law and those who make law.
Judges and quasi-judicial officials often provide reasoned justifications for decisions. We do not
now find explicitly religious grounds in opinions. A judge may examine religious sources to ascertain the community's attitudes about a practice or its deep moral assumptions, or a judge may
employ a familiar religious story to illustrate a point; but she will not reason in this manner: "Given
this religious truth, these conclusions about social good follow." Opinions are less than candid
about the comparative strength of arguments, but judges rely on arguments they think should have
force for all judges. That excludes arguments that rest on particular religious premises.
The story is not so simple for legislators. Members of Congress typically do not make religious arguments on the floor of Congress or before their constituents, but we have no settled understanding that they should avoid giving weight to their own religious convictions, and to those of
constituents. Legislators should give greater weight to reasons that are generally available, but
some reliance on religious reasons is all right, especially since generally available reasons are radically indecisive about some crucial social problems. Present practices among national legislators
reasonably accommodate their inclination to rely on all they believe with the needs of a religiously
diverse citizenry. If legislators rely on religious understandings more than their public advocacy
reflects, are they not lacking in candor? Does restraint impoverish discourse and leave voters less
well informed than they might be? Realism counsels that much legislators say is far from fully
candid, so self-restraint about religious grounds is hardly a major contributor to lack of candor. In
any case, even the value of self-restraint overrides this drawback and whatever reduction in information voters suffer. Let me be clear: I do not say legislators should deny religious bases that motivate them, only that they should not develop public arguments in these terms.
On the other hand, most citizens are not used to practicing this kind of self-restraint and they
do not participate actively in politics. They should not regard themselves as constrained to avoid
relying on or stating religious grounds. Citizens with a much more public role should conceive
themselves as subject to constraints like those for legislators.
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Religious leaders and organizations have a special place. They properly develop religious
grounds that bear on political problems and take part in direct efforts to win support for particular
positions. On the other hand, when religious leaders endorse parties or candidates, that is usually
unfortunate; those who become important public officials should not simultaneously hold themselves out as religious spokesmen.
Our society now has some loose conventions about religion in political life. Those conventions represent one appropriate approach within a liberal democracy, one that is well suited for our
society at this time. Within the larger culture a kind of sharp division exists between serious religion, which affects many people and has a considerable influence on political life, and the broad
culture, which has become largely nonreligious. That is regrettable, and would certainly be
lamented by Augustine, as well as every other serious religious thinker. Greater dialogue in the
broad culture about a religious or spiritual dimension of life would be healthy. But that does not
mean substantially increased injection of religious premises into discussions of particular political
issues would be desirable. Our present approach is by no means the only set of practices that could
carry out Augustine's vision of earthly government fulfilling essential tasks for citizens of varying
religious perspectives and commitment. But it serves that vision reasonably well.
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conclusion
I have suggested that religion should neither be excluded from politics nor play a part similar
to every other source for political judgment. I have argued for a generous attitude toward exemptions for religious believers from secular laws that impose demands at odds with their religious
understandings. I have supported aid to religious organizations only when the reason for aid concerns secular benefits, the aid is directed to those benefits, and religious groups are within a larger
category of beneficiaries. I have expressed some doubt whether these conditions are sufficient to
warrant substantial aid to private religious schools. I have not claimed that any of these conclusions
follow in some straightforward way from Augustine's positions; but I have argued that they fit reasonably well with his central theme. Of two things we may be sure; The City of God will remain a
source of deep insight and problems of religion and government will remain perplexing, long after
the difficulties on which I have focused have faded.
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"Some people worry there's too much of
it," said Moebie, "and others worry there's too
little." "So," she said, "discussion tends to be
banal and repetitive, because neither party wants
anything to change, lest it change for the worse."
"Some are worried," she said, "that more will be
a bad thing, and others that less will be." ''And
of course," she added, "neither party is happy
with the status quo."
Moebie reads people's minds and expects
other people to do this. I could not think what
she was talking about.
"So," she went on, "if you plan to write
about Christianity in higher education, too
much of it or too little, you should try to move
the discussion into a different venue entirely."
"Out of the chapel and into the weedy garden,"
she said resolutely.
"It won't do," she said, "to repeat the old
stuff, such as the fact that American colleges
were once Christian but now aren't, and too
bad." ''Also," she said, "everybody knows the
categories. There are Roman Catholic institutions, and evangelical institutions, and bible colleges, and church-related colleges that become
increasingly secular." "Don't," she said, "rehash
all that, and don't call for new mission statements."
Moebie reads minds but does not always
listen well. I had mentioned to her that I might
be writing on Christian higher education, not on
Christianity in higher education.
"I rather think," she rolled on, "that the
main issues are unpredictability and exclusion."
Moebie as a student of contemporary cultural
practices has frames of reference that are sometimes helpful but not always. "Also," she said,

"you should notice that certain colleges are distinctive in senses other than a religious sense,
since you should start your thinking by getting a
grasp on distinctiveness itself before you grapple
with Christian distinctiveness." "Hillsdale," she
said, "St. John's, the old City College of New
York, St. Andrews in North Carolina, Berea, and
Brown." "To name," she said, "a few."
So far I knew only that I wanted to say
nothing about either evangelical colleges or bible
colleges, since they seemed clear enough. They
knew what they were up to. Roman Catholic
colleges and universities I wasn't sure about. The
church-related colleges, some with poor relations or blathering relations, were on my mind.
"I don't see what Brown has in common
with Hillsdale," I said. "You mean the Brown in
the Ivy League, in Providence, Rhode Island, and
the Hillsdale among the green hills and dales in
the part of Michigan near the Indiana/Ohio
border?" My mind is securely geographical, if
not clairvoyant.
"I mean," she said impatiently, "the Brown
written up last February in Vanity Fair as the college choice of American and foreign tycoons
who send their children off to school augmenting their backpacks with BMWs." "The
university with few or no requirements," she
added, "and with lots of parking spaces for
limos, and where conversations among students
are about the innest expensive obscure vacation
spots and menus and makers of designerwear."
I thought she had just used one or more
nonwords in that outburst, but she was talking
about the rich, and the rich can do anything they
want. They and the media are our culture, after
all, banal and repetitive and uncareful of norms.
"Hillsdale," she went on, "is about libertarian
free-market behavior, or greed, as a beleaguered
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and misunderstood enterprise, propped up only
by this one small Michigan school and by certain
large foundations and well-heeled think tanks
and syndicated columnists, and by a man named
Richard Mellon Scaife with deep pockets." One
of Moebie's frames of reference is money.
"How, for example, would Hillsdale relate
to unpredictability and exclusion?" I proposed,
having no idea what she meant by those two
terms. "Exactly," she said.
She went on to say that colleges should
serve students, and students are not served if
they enter the work world as predictable entities. Because Hillsdale has a well-known ideology, promulgated through its free red
newsletter Imprimis, and through its on-campus
seminars with "von Mises" economists, Cheney
educationists, and Margaret Thatcher moral theorists, its graduates will be seen by the world as
predictable. You enroll at Hillsdale and get your
mind strung up with slogans of a certain type.
Thus as a student you are unserved. Your postcollege options tend to be circumscribed,
because employers see your mind as a set of
thought-structures rather than as a versatile
instrument. True, the options available to you in
free markets of all sorts, and other predations,
are apt to be lucrative enough.
But Hillsdale's method of being distinctive
is only one kind. Not that of City College or St.
Andrews. The old City College of the early
decades of the century was the place where
Jewish immigrant children enrolled, free. Their
intellectual vitality, based on both ambition and
a culture that worshiped learning, energized a
whole city, and even the nation. CCNY was a
famously unpredictable cauldron, a seedbed, a
site of ferment where ideas transformed themselves and the culture. If you wanted to sleep
your way through college, or emerge intellectually unscathed, this bed was not for you.
As for St. Andrews, here is a small Presbyterian college in North Carolina known for
making special accommodations to serve people
physically handicapped, long before the rest of
academia noticed such people. Berea in bluegrass Kentucky serves Appalachian students who
can't afford college, and requires all students to
hold jobs.
So Moebie recognized several kinds of distinctiveness. "Of course," she said serenely, "dis-

tinctiveness is accessed sometimes imperfectly."
"Just as there are unhandicapped students at St.
Andrews," she explained, "and unJewish students in the golden days of City College, so at
St. John's there will be students graduating tired
to death of the Great Books, and at Hillsdale
some students who find the sacred tenets of libertarianism and free markets to be unliberating
and gassy."
"The fact is, though," I noted, "that all the
schools you mention do something distinctive,
regardless of whether every single member of
the community buys into it." "Furthermore," I
pointed out, "the image of each of these, in the
public eye, is consistent with the institutional
aims."
We were sitting in the dark little cafe on
the main drag of Berkeley Springs, West Virginia, the resort town, where I had taken the risk
of salmon. The menu advised that it came covered with a mixture of feta cheese, black olives,
and tomatoes, accompanied by steamed kale, all
of which sounded terrible together but too fascinating to avoid. It was actually extremely tasty,
testimony to the merits of unpredictability.
Moebie ate common pasta.
"Analysts of higher education are destined
always to be a bit bemused," she announced,
staring at her linguini. "St. John's believes," she
said, "that education consists of watching various pasts in conversation, while Hillsdale
believes in turning to a constellation of certain
annoying ideas. For a bible college, fealty to a
collection of Mediterranean monotheistic and
messianic writings. In all three cases," she went
on, "there is a formal institutional faith which is
supposed to create on campus an aura, and
create in students a lifelong influence. But there
is no comprehensive formula for achieving, or
exact way of measuring," she said, "this cluster
of supposed present and future effects."
It may have been the eclecticity of the
salmon and feta, but I felt confused. Was Moebie
then affirming these formal commitments or
not? And what about Brown? "I merely give you
a frame of reference," she said, "using three
valid examples of distinctiveness." She wiggled
sauce among some of her strands. "Institutional
commitment of the kinds mentioned," she said,
"fail, however, to produce the exclusiveness that
must be the province of Christian higher educa-

tion." I forgot to mention that we were having
genuine West Virginia wine with our meal, the
only kind available at this cafe.
"The bible college," she said, "produces
preachers, and Hillsdale produces committed
capitalists, and St. John's produces genteel graduate students and future professionals." "Brown
in Vanity Fair," she said, "does not exactly produce, but believes that bright and ultra-rich
young people should be left alone with their
expensive toys and tans, to beautify a corner of
bleak and corrupt Rhode Island." "Institutions
of these sorts," she said, "are not able to nurture
the kind of exclusiveness the world needs."
I really thought that she had just named
some valuable exclusivenesses-respectively,
preaching, capitalizing, suburbanizing, and
pricey lolling. A fascinating American array, or
pandaemonium.
"Coming to the point," she said, "I don't
know where it is in the Bible, but you could find
it with a concordance: The Son of man came not
to be ministered unto but to minister, and
advised his followers to do the same." "Minister," she said, gratuitously, "means to serve."
"That," she said, "is the exclusiveness you're
looking for." "The Christian college," she said,
"would need to be a site of ferment yielding a
heady exclusion of certain sacred American
practices: competition as the world knows it,
greed, selfishness, exploitation, acquisitiveness,
non-involvement, silent acquiescence, and so
forth." "Zero rat-race tolerance," she added.
So it had come to that.
"Excluded for graduates of Christian colleges, I suppose you mean," I said, "are jobs and
professions without a large element of service."
A Roman Catholic expression occurred to me,
from one of the monastic orders: Laborare est
orare. To work is to pray. You would be choosing
only employment that could be seen as Godpleasing, as prayer actually. "When you graduate
from a Christian college," I said, gratuitously,
"you should exclude yourself from jobs that are
chiefly for personal gain, or megacorporate predation, or hype, or sleaze, or pandering marketing, or princely positions with punishing
hours leaving no self-time or service-time?"
"Not all things are permitted," she
responded. "Everybody knows that's what
Christianity is supposed to be teaching." "Or,"
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she said, "at least people not within the so-called
Christian community know it." "A Christian
college," she said, "would be one in which the
necessary exclusions in a student's future are
described and supported by at least a majority of
the faculty, by the career office certainly, and by
the official publications and public pronouncements."
This might be well and good, but it said
nothing about how many theology courses a student should take, or what the chapel service
should be like, or all of the other possible pieces
of religious apparatus that supposedly go into a
religious school. Do you have prayers at ballgames? Do you, like Georgetown University
lately, install a crucifix in each classroom, after a
year examining public opinion and the furnishings budget?
"That, of course, is the unpredictability,"
she said, reading my mind as usual. "There is no
recipe for exactly the nature of each institution's
apparatus," she went on. "Certain matters do go
without saying," she said. "You have to have a
chapel with changing decor and services, in a
masterly effort to catch people off guard. And a
strong theology department poking its nose into
other disciplines, and a campus counseling program exorcising private demons by emphasizing
the outward gaze and public service." "Other
than that," she said, "you have to count on
inspired invention."
Who would have predicted, I suddenly
thought, that Calvin College, church-related,
would have invented an inspired piece of apparatus called a "Festival of Faith and Writing,"
three days in early April of late Michigan winter,
attracting 1,300 of us, and turning down dozens
more, to hear each other and John Updike and
Elie Wiesel?
''And," Moebie said, "there is no predicting
how, out in the world, a graduate will creatively
adapt her job to her desire to serve, or entreat
her candidate for public office on some vexed
issue, or make it known why she does not buy
certain things, or find occasions confidently to
affirm the good and seek to reform the cruddy.
It's only that she will feel, with some exuberance
and nurtured resolution, her need to do these
things."
"That feeling, or conviction, if you will,"
she said, "does not necessarily arise as a message
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from the collective texts of St. John's or of Hillsdale, and not necessarily from the stimulating
intellectual contestations at City College." "Nor,
curiously," she said, "does it come from the bible
colleges, where the goal is not so much service
as it is salvation and a rising body count of the
converted."
"Weed your own and other people's gardens," Moebie said. "Put that in Latin, on a seal,
and it will sound better." "Pick up the litter,"
she said. "Tackle the tasks tasteless to other
people but necessary for civility and civilization." "In a time and nation," she added, "where
road rage and state-of-the-art stress are norms."
She opened her mouth again, and the sensation struck me (mind-reading?) that she was
going to summon some West Virginia afterdinner brandy. I quickly interposed. "So worry
too is excluded?" I inquired. "People shouldn't
worry about the exact amount of Christianity in

higher education-too much or too little-as if
studying the percentage of alcohol in wine?
Instead, colleges and their people should tout
service in a sort of richly flavored fullbodied
way."
"Excellent wine is a sine qua non," she
responded, and I realized that summoning
brandy, in this particular bistro, was far from her
mind. I would never learn to mind-read. "But
yes, an instilling of service-thinking is what
we're talking about," she said, as our server
appeared, smiling, confidently laying the check
at my elbow. Moebie earlier had said she would
be buying, but now she leaned back contentedly
and clasped her hands beatifically.

LOVE ENOUGH
He finished his biscuits and gravy
and drank the coffee from the blue mug,
pushed back his chair and looked at her
as he pumped water from the cistern
into the sink where he had cleaned
the rabbits, swirling the water and blood
around the white porcelain until
it was clean again. He stood at the window
and noticed how the grain was almost blue
in the summer haze, and sat down again
and took one of her hands in his and just
held it while talking to the old dog
on her gunny sack behind the stove.
He held her hand for a long time before
placing it very gently on the table
without looking at her, as if a direct look
would take it all away: the time, the place;
hoping the biscuits and gravy and the old dog
and the summer quiet were cement enough,
reason enough, love enough.

J. T. Ledbetter

From Dogwood, faithfully yours,

c.v.
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bon bini na Bonaire

]ana French

How in the world
do we meet
the Other
with a look that is
both modest and
penetrating?
Current Lilly Fellow
]ana French
gives an example.
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Neither lush nor green, the Netherland Antilles
defy American stereotypes about the Caribbean.
Bonaire, the second largest island of this Dutch
territory, is a case in point. A scrubby moonscape
punctuated by cacti, lizards, and occasional,
free-ranging goats and donkeys, its beauty is to
be found underwater, in and among the coral
reefs which begin just yards from shore and
which have earned Bonaire a reputation for
some of the best scuba diving and snorkeling in
the world. For windsurfers, the island's other
aqua-tourists, the appeal is athletic rather than
aesthetic. Warm, shallow bays draw this coterie,
as does the wind, which howls through the brush
and sand at 25 knots or more, cutting the strong
sun, by day, and the humidity, by night.
Bonaire is one of five autonomous islands
comprising the Netherland Antilles (N.A.). The
others include tiny Sint Eustatius, Sint Maarten,
and Saba-situated on the northern spine of the
Lesser Antilles-and Curacau, which, at 171
square-miles, is both the largest and most developed, as well as the site of the N.A. capital,
Willemstad. Next to Curacau and approximately
fifty miles north of Venezuela lies Bonaire,
which claims 112 square-miles and 15,000 citizens, including a large number of Dutch expatriates. Like Curacau, it is considered one of the
Leeward Islands, so-named because of their
location downwind of the steady northeasterly
trade winds.
I was an accidental snorkeler when my husband and I visited Bonaire last March. We had
come to windsurf, and my goal was to stay on
top of the water, not plumb its depths. By day
four, however, our muscles sore and hands callused, we decided to try a gentler sport. As I
donned the snorkeling equipment, I thought of

the speaker in Adrienne Rich's poem, "Diving
into the Wreck." My "absurd flippers" and
"grave and awkward mask," accoutrements that
would enable me to move like a voyeur among
the fish, crippled me on land. I hopped and waddled all the way to the water, and thensplash!-Joined the finny tribe: "so many who
have always/lived here/swaying their crenelated
fans/between the reefs."
Rich's poem is about estrangement. It is
also about discovery, submerging oneself in a
world "below the surface" of our ordinary, prosaic one, in order to find new ways of seeing and
knowing. Like her speaker, I was unprepared for
the otherness of the underwater world: mottled
gray trunkfish with Roman profiles, parrotfish
of rainbow (male) and speckled brown (female)
hues, graceful queen triggerfish, quick-darting
grunts, as well as more familiar aquariumdwellers such as angelfish, jacks, and hamlets.
Hanging motionless over the scene was a lone
barracuda, casing the reef for its mid-day meal.
And below, a spotted moray eel, undulating in
and out of a crevice of elkhorn coral, its cartoonwide eyes fixed on my own: The voyeur was
exposed.
Traveling, to me, is like this-an experience of estrangement and discovery which is also
an encounter with oneself. This is especially true
of travel in developing countries, where one's
own lifestyle, economic privileges, and assumptions about the way the world works are thrown
into relief against a backdrop of relative poverty.
To an American used to jumping in her car to
pick up a gallon of milk at a grocery store half a
mile away, the thought of walking five miles to
the nearest town (and back again) for a week's
worth of groceries is almost unimaginable. And
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yet this is common in places like Bonaire, as are
the subsistence farms which supplement those
groceries, just like they did for my grandparents
in northern Wisconsin during the Depression.
Walking ten miles in a day while carrying heavy
groceries is not only exhausting, but also timeconsuming (Americans tend to reserve this kind
of time and effort only for the gym), and yet
what option is there when one doesn't have a
car?
I have friends who on principle will not
visit the Caribbean because of the economic disparity one encounters there between land- and
hotel-owners and their workers, who often take
home wretched wages. Economic disparity is a
real problem, but such a response is elitist in its
own way. Not only does the language of boycott
imply a consumerist attitude toward the islands
(one that confirms, more than critiques, themessage sent by the tourist industry); it also dismisses the importance of learning from firsthand observation of the world.
"Bon bini na Bonaire!" Our host at the
guest house welcomed us in Papiamento, a
creole language based on Spanish, Dutch, and
Portuguese and spoken only in Curacao,
Bonaire, and Aruba (part of the Netherland
Antilles until 1986). While Dutch is the official
language on Bonaire, Papiamento is the lingua
franca. In the tourist areas, English is also widely
spoken, as evidenced by the island kids, who
shift seamlessly between the staccato consonants
of their home language and rounder inflections
of American slang.
Culturally, Bonaire combines Latin American, Dutch, and African influences. We
observed this at mealtime, especially. Breakfast
inevitably featured a sticky jumble of mangoes,
papayas, and other tropical fruit, balanced by
sensible hard rolls and Gouda cheese; lunch and
dinner offered more various fare, including
squash soup and-outside the main town of
Kralendijk-barbecued iguana. While one
could, of course, also order a hamburger and
Coke, the marked absence of cows on the island
encouraged us to stick with local specialties,
especially fresh seafood.
Bonaire's African influences are subtler.
Merengue music, which incorporates West
African drumming rhythms, floats over the loudspeakers in most public places, an import from

Haiti and the Dominican Republic, where it was
developed along with the dance. While 75% of
the island's citizens identify as Roman Catholic,
Bonaire, like many colonized parts of the world,
blends religious observance and ritual from a
number of different traditions. One example of
this is Simadan, a weekend-long block party of
sorts, during which a community gathers to harvest one another's fields, then gives thanks for
the bounty through music and dance. Other traditional celebrations, including the festivals of
SanJuan Gune 24) and San Pedro Gune 29), bear
striking resemblance to those of the AfricanAmerican Gullah culture, practiced on the Sea
Islands off the South Carolina and Georgia
coasts.
This creative amalgam of cultures and languages points to the island's colonial history.
Prior to the arrival of the Spanish, in the early
sixteenth century, Bonaire was inhabited by the
Arawak Indians, a peaceful tribe which had
migrated from present-day Venezuela and Brazil
and which was all but annihilated with the
arrival of the Europeans. When the Dutch
claimed Bonaire in 1634, largely for its salt
resources, they lost no time incorporating the
island into the Dutch West India Company, but
they forbade its settlement. This ban was lifted
in 1868, and thereafter-with the exception of a
British occupation during the Napoleonic warBonaire has remained in Dutch possession.
With Curacau the center of the Caribbean
slave trade from the sixteenth century onward,
human labor was cheap and easy to come by on
the neighboring islands. The Netherlands transported approximately half a million African
slaves, delivering them to various islands in the
Dutch West Indies as well as to Suriname, formerly a Dutch colony. Today, the southwest
corner of Bonaire bears an eerie reminder of its
slaving past in a pair of villages overlooking the
vast, flamingo-dotted salt flats which cover the
bottom quarter of the island. Built in 1850 to
house the flat-workers, the huts are uniform in
shape and size, each about the dimensions of a
small pup tent (at 5'9", I could just stand upright
in the middle of one.) In shape and color the huts
of the northern village ironically recall Dutch
colonial architecture, their blinding whitewash
brilliant against the intense blue sky; by contrast,
the "red" huts of the southern village, though

similar in shape, are a pale ocher. All the huts
face the ocean, a cruel reminder of the Middle
Passage, as one feels small looking out over all
that water.
Like all places with histories of slavery,
Bonaire is beset by economic inequality played
out along racial lines. The wealthiest people on
the island are the white Europeans and Americans on holiday. With a few exceptions, the
resorts, condominiums, and restaurants seem to
be owned and operated by Dutch expatriates. As
in certain pockets of the U.S., most of the service providers and physical laborers are black or
biracial, though in Kralendijk I also observed
people of color in higher ranked managerial
positions. Does this distinguish Bonaire among
its Caribbean neighbors, so notorious for their
exploitative wage systems? Hardly, but it does

indicate that change is on the way-something I
would not have known had I remained at home,
content to draw my impressions from American
media exposes.
As a child, I rode in the back of a station
wagon, visiting national parks, museums, cemeteries, and Civil War battlegrounds. That is how
I learned about history and culture. Never one
to retain abstract dates and facts divorced from
their referents, I have to say that nothing much
has changed; I still travel to learn, except that
now I board planes instead of the family car.
Maybe there's merit in this eye-witness. At the
very least, it gives me the opportunity to "see
the damage that was done/and the treasures that
prevail," as Adrienne Rich puts it, to experience
"the thing itself and not the myth." For me,
that's reason enough to pack my bags.

LURE
I sit and watch
The man's blunt fingers
Tying flies:
A few thin hairs from deerhide swatch,
or from a pheasant feather-

The fingers choose
And tap them in a vial
Till all are even,
Then tie them with a wiry thread
Around a hook
As small and delicate
As sin itself,
Hidden, almost,
Below the tight-bound spray.
I sit, and watch, and wonder:
What fish will be seduced?
Am I the fish?
Ami
The fly?

Edith E. Cutting
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David W. Gill (ed.). Should God Get
Tenure? Essays on Religion and
Higher Education. Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1997.

If asked, Should God Get
Tenure?, a member of a faculty
committee charged with deciding
such questions would probably
respond, "Well, it all depends on
the strength of God's credentials in
teaching, research, and service to
the university and to the community." After reviewing those credentials, she would probably view
teaching as weak, the students do
not seem to have learned what was
being taught, research as inadequate, only one book, and university and community service as
weak, look at the mess the university and the world are in. To which,
Gill properly responds, "Cute." But
with that rhetorical question, and
mining the metaphor 'tenure,' Gill
focuses on how firmly religion
should be established in higher education. Marginalized, particularly
in the last half of the twentieth century, "Students and faculty members of faith often find their interests ignored, ruled out of order, or
treated with contempt" (2). No
longer expecting hegemony in academic life, religion seeks a permanent position alongside other disciplines such as history, physics, philosophy, economics. Should it be

granted that position?
Gill offers his anthology as a
contribution to an ongoing discussion, participated in notably by
George Marsden, Stephen Carter,
and Page Smith, among others. Distinctive here is seventeen evangelicals arguing for the "critical appreciation" of the role of God and religion, whether that religion be
Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu,
Buddhist, or Native American.
They contend that on a curricular
level, courses in the Bible and
World Religions ought to be part of
the general education curriculum.
Further, "God-talk" and religious
perspectives ought to be mainstreamed, where appropriate, into
courses throughout the curriculum.
And, students should be encouraged to religious practice and
activism. As a goal of art history
and criticism is to encourage artistic
creativity, a goal of religious studies
is to encourage religious practice.
Gill summarizes the argument: "If
our colleges and universities are to
fulfill their higher aspirations of
educating whole persons for the
real world in all of its diversity and
challenges, we need these days to
go bravely against the flow and
'give God tenure"' (7).
Developing the argument of
the anthology, the contributors discuss variations on the central issue.
Their themes range from teaching,

clarifying the meaning of academic
excellence, the relation of religion
to the sciences and humanities, religious toleration and human rights,
ethics, the relation of religion to
human life including such topics as
sexual desire and the psychological
need for God, to religious
approaches to higher education.
The perspectives taken on these
topics range from English, Theology, History, Biblical Studies, Philosophy, Psychology, to Political
Theory.
Though point-counterpoint is
rarely found, a healthy dialectic
results, possibly in deep disagreement. For example, Westphal
appeals to Aristotle to understand
academic excellence, and the discussion of the German Baptist
Brethren reveal the Calvinism of
Dumbaugh. Providing differing
viewpoints on an issue can prod the
imagination to new insights.
Leaving the issues open-ended, Gill
and his authors invite us to participate in the ongoing discussion.
Should their answer to the
question of giving God a permanent position in the academy persuade us? Gill's problem is an offshoot of the Athens/Jerusalem
debate. However, instead of
inquiring about their relation, if
any, the authors focus on what role,
if any, Jerusalem should have in
Athens. The issue could be fairly

restated, "Should Jerusalem have a
permanent mission in Athens?"
Stating the issue in that manner
allows us to identify a fissure that
weakens the book's overall impact.
In addition to the variety of disciplines represented among the contributors, consider the religious
slant they bring to the subject. Each
essay is written by an evangelical
who was sometime aJ. Omar Good
Distinguished Visiting Professor of
Evangelical Christianity at Juniata
College. What is an Evangelical?
Noll, quotes approvingly the definition given by English historian
D.W. Beddington, '"Conversionism,
the belief that lives need to be
changed; activism, the expression
of the gospel in effort; biblicism, a
particular regard for the Bible; and
what may be called crucicentrism, a
stress on the sacrifice of Christ on
the cross' "(196). No dissenting
voice from the academy is included
in the discussion. Furthermore,
most, but not all of them teach in
church-related colleges and universities. As one reads through the
essays, the impression builds that
one is hearing from only one side of
the argument and that those who
speak are speaking to each other.
While speaking only among supporters, persuasion is easy, too easy.
Having recognized their particular angle on the issue, it is
important to note that few have
worked in Athens in its secular university form. Yet, the audience
seems to be those institutions that
have excluded religion as a viable
subject matter. If that is the case, it
is not clear that these essays carry
the punch their authors would hope
for. For example, they do not
address the concerns of such
schools, particularly their mission
or the way disciplines are practiced
in them. For example, no essay is
concerned with engaged learning or
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preprofessional learning. Further,
most disciplines in Athens are practiced within the assumed framework of "science," or "positivism,"
or "language" and the underlying
commitment to the view of knowledge on which each of those frameworks rest. But no essayist engages
such assumptions underlying
teaching and learning in Athens.
Finally, academic disciplines, particularly the humanities, seem
deeply affected by the disengaged
language of second order critical
theory, postmodemism, as some
would call it. Again, no sustained
conversation in the essays addresses
problems inherent in that approach
to education, such as the difficulty
of practicing religion in a disengaged manner.
In sum, those who live in
Athens and who are open to the
possibility of a permanent mission
from Jerusalem within its life
would find here little to help them
argue their case with those who
would vote negatively. But, those
faculty who are not Evangelicals or
religious, for that matter, would not
likely be impressed with their arguments. However, those who would
be inclined to be persuaded by these
arguments live in institutions where
Jerusalem has a permanent diplomatic mission in Athens.
Thomas 0. Buford

Russell T. McCutcheon. Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on
Sui Generis Religion and the Politics
of Nostalgia. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997. 249 pp.
There has been considerable discussion recently among scholars of
religion, attempting to redefine
what the whole field of religious
studies is as an academic discipline,
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and Russell McCutcheon wades in
here to do battle. As signaled by the
title, McCutcheon's book is a
sharp, sustained critique of the way
religion is studied in North
America, with an alternate proposal
for a naturalist, materialist method
of studying religion. His basic
thesis, which he repeats over and
over throughout the book, is that
scholars of religion have carried on
a privileged discourse that covertly
allows them to exert control over
the manufacture and study of religion. The discourse strategy that
they use for this manufacture of
religion, he says, is sui generis religion, that is, the argument that religion is a separate dimension of
human life that must be studied
with its own distinctive methodology. This has allowed scholars of
religion to maintain control over
the study of religion as a separate
discipline, excluding other scholars
and methodologies.
McCutcheon's book is a revision of his Ph.D. dissertation at the
Centre for the Study of Religion of
the University of Toronto, with two
additional chapters. The basic
rationale for his study seems to
grow out of his examination of
what he calls the politically charged
nature of the writings and theories
of Mircea Eliade, an influential
figure in the development of religious studies today. This study
occupies the first half of the book
and ranges broadly through some
of Eliade's writings, drawing especially on critical discussions about
Eliade. His interest is not so much
studying Eliade per se but rather
highlighting what he calls two distinct discourses on religion. The
one discourse, associated with
Eliade but established as the regnant discourse in religious studies,
is the sui generis discourse which is
"conservative, elite, romantic,

hegemonic, regressive, ahistorical,
and domesticating" (p. 73 ), a discourse which uses strategies of containment and exclusion to disguise
and defend its privileged realm.
The alternative discourse is the naturalistic or materialistic discourse
which accounts for religious
behavior and experiences on the
basis of historically based theoretical categories related to social,
political, or economic causes. The
naturalistic discourse, McCutcheon
holds, is the only one suited for
public academic research and dialogue.
McCutcheon devotes considerable attention to suggestions that
Eliade's scholarship was linked to
fascist movements in his native
Rumania. He admits that there is
little or no evidence that could confirm that Eliade actually was a
member of the Rumanian fascist
movement. Yet he argues that by
appealing to sui generis religion,
especially in his nostalgic calls to
restore past archaic values, Eliade
attempted to reestablish and
thereby entrench dominant distributions of power; thus we can call
his views "fascist." Extending his
indictment beyond Eliade, who he
claims is simply representative of
most other scholars, McCutcheon
argues that similar political and
social factors motivate the regnant
group of scholars of religion today
to follow this sui generis exclusionary strategy, because it allows
them effectively and covertly to
control the manufacture and academic study of religion.
In the second half of the book
McCutcheon goes on to survey several other "discursive sites" which,
he finds, similarly demonstrate the
dominance of the sui generis model
in religious studies. He looks briefly
at some of the textbooks available
for introductory courses in compar-

ative religion today, concluding
that they uniformly adopt the sui
generis line, often using the code
phrase "taking religion seriously"
to mask their assumption of the
irreducibility
of
religion.
McCutcheon finds further proof of
the regnancy of this "essentialist"
discourse on sui generis religion in
some other sites of current scholarship, such as the recent multi-volumed Encyclopedia of Religion
(edited by Mircea Eliade) and some
papers from the most recent
meeting of the International Association for the History of Religions
Having found this sui generis
model dominant in religious studies
today, McCutcheon proceeds to
argue that scholars of religion actually participate in a larger system of
political, economic, and cultural
imperialism. As an example of this
he focuses on the American media
attention given to the Vietnamese
Buddhists who set themselves on
fire during the Vietnam War.
McCutcheon finds that religious
scholars, in interpreting these selfburnings not as overtly political acts
but exclusively in terms of Buddhist
traditions of self-sacrifice, were
actually joining together with the
New York Times and other news
media in a complex system of
power and control to provide
interpretations that managed and
controlled these events.
Yes, all of that and more are in
this book! Almost hidden in this
aggressive attack on religious
studies are some interesting and
useful suggestions. Certainly the
field of religious studies today is in
need
of
redefinition,
and
McCutcheon's call for more
emphasis on multidisciplinary
models and on developing defensible theories of religion is welcome. It is important to see and
interpret religion within all the full-

ness of human experience, and that
certainly includes social, economic,
political, and psychological factors.
He rightly points to overly romanticized and spiritualized descriptions of religion in some of the
introductory textbooks and among
some popular writers. He raises
good questions about the adequacy
of approaches that rely exclusively
on insider interpretations as given
by believers, as, for example, textbooks that have each religion presented by a devotee of that particular religious tradition. And surely
scholars of religion need to be carefully aware of their own cultural
and political presuppositions.
However, in many ways this is
a flawed book, with its expose style
and sloganistic formulas. The judgments rendered are simplistic and
totalistic in a way unsupported by
the evidence McCutcheon adduces.
For example, his study of Eliade
relies surprisingly little on Eliade's
own writings and heavily on critics
of Eliade. Then he makes a big leap
from Eliade to all scholars of religion, lumping together a very
diverse range of writers including
Joseph Campbell, Huston Smith,
and even Stephen Carter as if they
are all equally representative of the
"regnant discourse" in the study of
religion. Such a totalistic analysis
fails to recognize the very different
methods and the multiplicity of
approaches used by scholars of religion today. Scholars may consider
Eliade to be inspirational, for
example, but very few would
follow uncritically his theories and
methods.
McCutcheon singles out the
"history of religions" school associated with the University of Chicago
as a particularly dominant representative of sui generis religion,
basing this judgment simply on
comments from a couple of

scholars. Yet he does no analysis of
the writings of representatives of
this school. In this whole discussion
there is rarely a citation from History of Religions, the longstanding
Chicago journal that would be
prime material for anyone studying
this history of religious schools. (In
contrast, McCutcheon brings in
very many citations from Method
and Theory in the Study of Religion,
a journal of which he is co-editor).
And there is only passing mention
of other leading scholars such as
Joseph Kitagawa, arguably as influential as Eliade in the Chicago
school, and one who emphasized
multidisciplinary methods in the
study of religion.
His analysis of introductory
textbooks is sketchy, singling out
certain ones for appropriate criticism, but judging others as promoting "sui generis religion"
simply because they use certain categories such as the sacred, ritual,
myth, and symbol. One wonders
why he chooses to look at introductory textbooks (which strive to
interest general students in the
study of religion) rather than the
more advanced studies which presumably would better reflect the
current methodologies in the field
of religious studies. McCutcheon
does cite one scholarly article, Jan
Yiin-hua's lengthy study of Buddhist self-immolations in Chinese
history (History of Religions 4
[1965], 243-268), to support his
argument that religious scholars
managed and controlled the interpretation of the Vietnamese monks'
self-immolations. Because Jan
chose to devote a scholarly article
to investigating the Chinese Buddhist history of self-immolations,
with only passing reference to political issues in Vietnam, McCutcheon
concludes that he uses strategies of
representation that are "complicit

with such larger issues of cultural,
economic, and political power and
privilege" (p. 176). Using that kind
of logic, every study of a religious
event or person that does not focus
on political and social issues would
similarly be complicit in the larger
system of political, economic, and
cultural imperialism! That in fact is
explicitly the direction he suggests
taking-examining media, government, and scholarly interpretations
of various historical episodes, to
demonstrate the ways in which it
may have been economically,
socially, or politically beneficial to
portray those events as essentially
religious.
Clearly McCutcheon has an
ax to grind in this aggressive attack
on religious studies. To review this
book adequately one would have to
adopt McCutcheon's own style,
analyzing the discursive strategies
that he uses to cloak his own issues
of power and control. But that
would require a review much too
long, and it would not be all that
interesting. It is relevant, however,
that McCutcheon himself does not
study any particular religious traditions or activities; rather, he says,
he studies the scholars who study
religion. So he is a metacritic, developing theories and explanations
about how and why religious
scholars study and write what they
do. Certainly, such critiques can be
helpful, and, as pointed out above,
occasionally McCutcheon makes
insightful suggestions. Yes, there is
room for naturalistic theories of
religion, and multidisciplinary
approaches are very much needed.
Unfortunately, by arguing in a totalistic way for a naturalistic discourse
and excluding the value of descriptions and interpretations in religious study, McCutcheon undercuts his own call for a multidisciplinary, polymethodic approach to
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religious study. What he sees as
"multidisciplinary" is really limited
to political, social, and economic
explanations of what is called religion. He draws a sharp line
excluding methods that turn to
description, interpretation, and
understanding, all of which, he
says, promote "sui generis religion." A method of study that
brushes aside questions of meaning
and understanding, that gives no
credence to the way insiders understand their own religion, that insists
only on materialistic theoriessuch a method is surely imperialistic in its own way. Hopefully,
scholars of religion can avoid such
a false dichotomy. They can certainly acknowledge that the religious experiences they study are
not autonomous, that they are
influenced by all kinds of factors
and can be studied by a variety of
disciplines -and they still can
"take religion seriously" in interpreting how people find meaning in
such experiences.
Theodore M. Ludwig

Gregory Baum. The Church for
Others: Protestant Theology in
Communist East Germany. Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996. 156 pp.
For someone interested in an
introduction to the largely terra
incognita of Protestant theology in
the former German Democratic
Republic (GDR), Baum's terse,
well-written volume would be an
appropriate place to start. Alas, the
book is slightly blemished by several sins of omission and by the
author's overt identification with
his subject matter; for as Baum
acknowledges, the book could be
read as "a defense of the Church's
theological integrity" (xiv) during
its short-lived experiment as "the

Church in socialism" (Kirche im tion"- alternately expressed as
"critical solidarity" with the govSozialismus).
Baum persuasively makes the ernment.
Maintaining this consensus
case that, unlike the staid academic
theology in West Germany, the required constant deliberation, and
Church in the East developed a fun- Baum accordingly devotes considdamentally "contextual theology " erable space to summarizing and
in response to political and social analyzing important theological
developments. In the first chapter, statements and documents from
Baum provides a brief overview of various church leaders. Of particChurch-State relations in the GDR ular importance are the writings of
from 1945 to 1989. He character- the Bund's first president, Albrech
izes the fifties as a period of harsh Schoenherr, who, while recogreligious repression from the Stal- mzmg substantial differences
inist Socialist Unity Party (SED). · between Christianity and MarxismThe sixties witnessed greater free- Leninism,
was
nonetheless
doms and open theological discus- "impressed by the biblical roots of
sion, culminating in the Church's the socialist vision" and conselandmark decision in 1969 to sever quently eschewed the "liberal
its links with the West German dream of freedom and competiChurch and form an independent tion" in favor of a less repressive,
Kirchenbund (Church Union) . The "reformable socialism" at home
key event of the seventies was a (66-67). Other high-profile pastors,
meeting-March 6, 1978-by like Heino Falcke and Werner
church
leaders
with
Erich Krusche, reasoned similarly. While
Honecker, which resulted in even all were troubled by the official
greater civil rights for the churches. atheism taught in schools and by
This in turn, in the eighties, allowed socialist practices such as the
the Church to become home to a ]ugendweihe (a socialist variant of
variety of new citizens' movements confirmation), leaders tended to
protesting environmental condi- seek a diplomatic middle ground
tions and Cold War militarism, and between outright rejection and
offering unprecedentedly radical uncritical acceptance of GRD policritiques of SED leadership. These cies. Church leaders, Baum summamovements, of course, contributed rizes, did not want a Western-style
to the revolutionary climate of "pluralism of inconsequentiality,
1989.
the utterance of personal preferBaum's focus, however, is not ences without the attachment to the
history, but the theology of the common good" but rather "a free
Kirchenbund, the largest Protestant discussion of ideas and policies by
body in the GDR, and especially its people committed in various ways
efforts to define itself as the Church to the socialist project" (75).
not against, not for, not beside, but
Church notables also critiin socialism (66). Although eight cized past Lutheran theology,
regional churches with different which they felt was in part respontheological accents (Lutheran and sible for the Church's cowardly
Lutheran/Reformed) made up the behavior toward Hitler. Drawing
Bund, Baum makes clear that its inspiration from the writings of
leaders wholeheartedly supported Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the
their adopted motto: "Neither total Barmen Declaration (1934), which
refusal nor total accommoda- rejected the Lutheran doctrine of

two kingdoms and affirmed the relevance of Christ for the whole of
human life (including politics),
leaders believed that Christians
must engage in mature cooperation
with the powers-that-be "to make
socialism a more just form of
human interaction" (61). Following
the Confessing Church, they criticized Lutheranism for promoting
political quietism and exaggerated
obedience to the State. Instead,
Christians should affirm "perpetual
nonintegration" into the nationstate and work to make Christianity
a social "praxis," as Bonhoeffer had
emphasized, primarily devoted not
to the personal quest for justification but to a vision which "mediates
liberating and reconciling action ..
. [and] leads to society's eventual
transformation"(93). In short, the
Church should be socially engaged
in important causes, in fruitful dialogue with but not obsequious to
the State.
Baum does a convincing job in
locating this sentiment among
many of the Bund's leading figures.
Yet his indiscriminate approval of
their stance does not provide him
the distance necessary to offer a
more substantively critical, or for
that matter even balanced, analysis.
His most obvious omission is the
failure to point out that the
Church's revisionist theological
agenda and its leaders' refusal to
criticize socialism at root made the
Church, ironically, rather subservient, or at least not terribly
threatening to the State. Against its
own principles then the Church
behaved in a manner not wholly
unlike nineteenth-century Protestants under the Prussian monarchy
or "German-Christians" under
National Socialism. One could even
argue that in defining its mission
almost exclusively in terms of social
activism-instead of, say, prophetic

critique or evangelical proclamation-the Church m classic
German-Lutheran fashion hadagain-tied its identity rather
closely to the ideology of the State.
(The GDR government was
delighted, for example, that the
Bund through the World Council of
Churches supported socialist liberation movements in the Third
World.)
Furthermore, Baum's story is
strictly one of elites; he does not tell
us much about Church life in general or about how lay people
viewed their leaders' positions.
This would have been a revealing

story (and not unlike America's
own "mainline tale"), because
during the Bund' s brief existence
popular disillusionment with the
clergy and a general secularization
of GDR society far outpaced even
that of a religiously deracinated
West Germany. Even Schoenherr,
president of the Bund, admitted in
the 80s that the Church was
becoming a Pfarrerkirche, a "church
for clergymen"(24). To be sure, this
was in large part due to the government's own atheistic policies. Still,
the Church's "diplomatic," "balanced" decision to concentrate on
the beneficence of socialism's

STRAWBERRY PICKING WITH LUCY
Impatient to launch
our expedition,
I bend over to brush
a wavy swirl from her sticky,
sleeping forehead .
She clutches
an ancient stuffed toy
and a small red pilow she knitted
for herself when she was small.
The soft curves
of new-grown breasts, visible
beneath the strawberry-printed cotton
of her summer nightgown,
startle me. She'd rather dream
than wake.
Side by side
in the generous
warmth of the early morning sun,
we work our way down
leafy rows. Kneeling and reaching,
we fill our baskets with
perfect berries waiting in their bedsfirst fruits of summer, warm
and sweet
and delicate
and ripe.

Diana Postlethwaite
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ideals, instead of on its manifold
real evils, might have been a regrettable tactical mistake; and one that
sure alienated parishioners, who
were less concerned with the putatively noble longings of socialism
than with mundane things like Stasi
surveillance, travel restrictions,
ubiquitous
bureaucracy,
and
prison-like living conditions.
There is perhaps a lesson for
Christians and citizens, East and
West alike, in revisiting East Germany's brief, peculiar past. And it
is simply to remember that
socialism has indeed been an unfortunate blight on twentieth-century

appropriately expect from her a
rich and rewarding, although certainly not an uncontroversial, discussion of university education.
Readers of Cultivating Humanity
will be only mildly disappointed.
In Cultivating Humanity,
Nussbaum joins the ranks of the
"New Stoics." Her Stoicism, it
should be noted, is much thinner
metaphysically than some New
Stoics, such as Lawrence Becker of
the College of William and Mary.
(Stoicism Light stops with the
moral and political commitments of
Stoicism, abjuring the foundational
views about human beings, fate,
and divinity upon which these commitments originally rested.) It is
thick enough, she believes, to provide us with the proper understandings of both education and citizenship and, thus, to guide in the
reform of the university curriculum. She endorses the Stoic's
ideal of "liberal education" as an
education that "liberates the mind
from the bondage of habit and
custom, producing people who can
function with sensitivity and alertMartha C. Nussbaum, Cultivating ness as citizens of the whole world"
Humanity: A Classical Defense of (8). That is to say that the goal of
Reform in Liberal Education. Cam- education is what the Stoic philosobridge, MA: Harvard University pher Seneca termed "the cultivaPress, 1997. xii + 328 pp.
tion of humanity."
For what kind of life, exactly,
It should create no small stir is one equipped when the shackles
in the halls of the academy when of habit and custom have been
Martha C. Nussbaum, Ernst Freund thrown off by a liberated mind? A
Professor of Law and Ethics at the life as a "world citizen," the Stoic
University of Chicago, addresses Nussbaum replies.
What that
the reform of university curricula. amounts to is that "however we
Nussbaum has written widely, cre- order our varied loyalties, we
atively and insightfully about topics should still be sure that we recogin ancient Greek philosophy as well nize the worth of human life wheras philosophy and literature, her ever it occurs and see ourselves as
The Fragility of Goodness (1986) bound by common human abilities
and Love's Knowledge (1990) two and problems to people who lie at a
of the most important books of phi- great distance from us" (9). Three
losophy to have been published in "capacities" are needed for this
the last twenty years. Readers type of life. First is the capacity, so
history. From Lenin and Stalin, to
Ceausescu and Honecker, to
socialist holdouts like Cuba and
North Korea today, the historical
track-record of socialism has been
abysmal. Its anthropology, its antireligious humanism, its volitionmaiming statism, and its supercilious contempt for entrepreneurial
activity have crippled the material
well-being, not to mention the spiritual lives, of millions of human
beings. It is for this reason all the
more puzzling why authors like
Baum-among other quasi-socialist
voices in the West's clerical-academic estate-continue to offer armchair support to the noble Gnosis of
socialism while regretting so many
"betrayed"revolutions. Shouldn't
we recognize by now that given
humankind's centuries-old impoverished and authoritarian past and
our own century's socialist-induced
miseries that liberal democracy and
capitalism might have earned, at
least, two cheers?
Thomas A. Howard

well exemplified by Socrates, for
living an examined life, a life of
constant questioning, of accepting
only those beliefs that "survive
reason's demand for consistency
and for justification." Secondly, citIzens of cultivated humanity
require an "ability" to see themselves as united by common needs
and concerns with all human
beings. The third "ability" citizens
must have is sympathy, or what
Nussbaum terms the "narrative
imagination," "the ability to think
what it might be like to be in the
shoes of a person different from
oneself, to be an intelligent reader
of that person's story, and to understand the emotions and wishes and
desires that someone so placed
might have" (11). Nussbaum's first
three chapters, thus, address each
of these concerns, her chapters on
Socratic self-examination and
world-citizenship particularly persuastve.
Having explored Socratic
self-examination, what unites
humans across cultures, and how
literature may contribute to an
increased understanding and sensitivity to others, Nussbaum directs
her attention to what a world citizen must know about non-western
cultures, about African-Americans,
about women, and about human
sexuality. She contrasts several poor
ways to study non-western cultures,
romanticizing or seeing the other as
mirror to oneself, for example, with
an approach which recognizes the
other as human and, as such,
sharing a common set of problems,
yet distinct from one's own culture
or group as a result of a different set
of experiences. She traces the
development of African-American
studies programs with special attention to Harvard University and presents a case for African-American
studies programs that avoid the

errors of the politics of identity.
She discusses gender bias in the university and addresses the charge
that women's studies programs are
little more than programs of indoctrination. She argues that the
Socratic examination of sex, as
every other area, is essential to the
creation of a more truly deliberative, democratic community. The
book closes with a discussion of the
extent to which a religious university may and must embrace her
Stoic vision of liberal education as
preparation for world citizenship
while adding to it the concerns of
transmitting a particular religious
tradition. Throughout the book
Nussbaum attempts to make her
proposals concrete by discussing
what she has discovered as achievements as well as on-going problems
at campuses such as The University
of California-Riverside, Belmont
College, Brigham Young University,
University of Notre Dame, St.
Lawrence University, University of
Nevada-Reno and Brown University.
There is a great deal more
wisdom here than many of Nussbaum's conservative critics may be
inclined to recognize. This should
come as no surprise; Martha Nussbaum's stoicism comports well with
Enlightenment liberalism (indeed,
was foundational for Enlightenment liberalism) and while there is
much that is wrong with Enlightenment liberalism, there is also much
that is right. So, for example, she
argues that "good teaching will
show that to refuse all application
of moral standards to a foreign
person or culture is not really a way
of treating that person with
respect" (137). The problem is not
with applying moral standards to
other cultures, the problem is being
inadequately circumspect and
reflective in making moral judg-

ments and in the failure to distinguish between a moral judgment
and actions that may be compatible
with, but not required by that judgment. That type of careful reflection is a skill and discipline for
which the study of philosophy prepares one; thus Nussbaum argues
that all university students should
be required to study philosophy.
At several points, in fact,
Nussbaum takes up postmodern
relativism and skepticism and identity-politics, clearly articulating
their incompatibility with democratic ideals and practices and the
value of persons. While she dismisses conservative claims that universities have become bastions of
postmodernism as wild exaggerations, she admits and combats several errors of postmodernism. Nor
is she attacking straw people. At my
own institution, not a hotbed of
radicalism by any plausible standards, some faculty have raised
objections to our new first year core
course, "The Human Experience,"
on the basis, apparently, that in
examining texts dealing with birth,
coming of age, citizenship, love,
work and play, and death as representative aspects of the human
.
.
.
expenence we are tmposmg one
particular framework as definitive
of the human experience. But this
emperor, as Nussbaum might
argue, wears no clothes. It surely is
the case that all humans, not just
white Western males, experience
birth and death and that all reflective humans ponder the meaning of
these experiences for their lives.
The experiences of developing
from childhood to full membership
in a community, of discerning how
one should relate to other members
of the community and the human
race and of special others, of
making some sense of what one
should do with one's days are

40141 The Cresset Trinity 11998 Special Issue Lillv Fellows Prowam in Humanities and the Arts

common human problems and
potentially insightful avenues for
understanding what unites humans
as well as what distinguishes one
group from another. Nussbaum
advocates some recognition of such
common human problems as essential to avoiding some frequent pitfalls in the study of non-western
cultures.
She recognizes, as well, that
even though we are to be world citizens we are also local citizens. The
education of world citizens requires
a "detailed acquaintance with the
local sphere in which most of their
actions will be undertaken." Thus,
she argues that it is imperative that
we know who our students are and
what they know and don't know as
we plan their course of studies. All
U.S. students, she maintains, should
understand something of American
constitutional traditions and their
background in Western political
philosophy. The preservation of
existent democracies depends upon
citizens understanding those institutions and their histories. A privileging of the local may be in some
tension with world citizenship, but
it is not logically incompatible with
it. That is a wise perception.
Nussbaum, if not a traditionalist, is nevertheless respectful and
engaging of traditionalist concerns
that African-American studies programs and women's studies programs, because they are not disciplines, may lead to universities
graduating students with no real
grasp or training in a discipline.
Her response is twofold: universities have long recognized other academic programs that are not disciplines, her own areas of study, Classics, the most notable example.
Classics departments mix language
study with history, literature, and
philosophy, with no real disciplinary practices. Nevertheless, Nuss-

baum acknowledges that all students who graduate should exhibit
mastery of some structured body of
knowledge; some sustained disciplinary engagement should accompany every area studies program.
Substantively, the book's
greatest weaknesses, to my mind,
appear in her final two chapters.
Although she makes some helpful
distinctions and brings clarity to the
discussion of what it might mean to
speak of the "social construction"
of gender roles, the challenges that
have been raised about her discussion of same-sex sexual practices in
ancient Athens ought not go
unnoted. But even if she were correct about male-male relationships
in ancient Athens, it is unclear what
follows from this. Looking at
Athens through the "prism of
gender" might well lead one to the
conclusion that the basis of the
approval of male-male relationships was the radical devaluation of
women in that culture, as she herself sometimes acknowledges. To be
sure, an understanding of sexual
practices that are different from our
own might well lead democratic citizens to a welcome second-thinking
about contemporary American
sexual mores. If that is the object,
however, the sexual practices of the
ancient Israelites might, in fact,
prove more challenging to American students than that of ancient
Athens.
But why, one may wonder, is
the study of sexuality and of different sexual practices so important
to the contemporary world-citizen?
During our lives most humans,
especially if we move beyond the
western world, spend far more of

their time on food-planning,
preparing, and eating-than on sex
(although, apparently, western
males, at any rate, spend more time
thinking about sex). Why isn't it as
pressing a need for world citizens
to reflect upon food and the traditions of eating that we have uncritically accepted? Why are research
programs about what one eats, how
one eats, with whom one eats, how
frequently one thinks about eating,
etc. as compelling a need as similar
programs in which the object of
study is sexuality? In short, there
would appear to be more than just
the demands of world citizenship
that drives Nussbaum's agenda at
this point.
Nussbaum's discussion of religious universities fares worse. For
Nussbaum what is important about
religion is that it is a powerful force
for teaching and motivating
neighbor-love. Religious universities, precisely because of their religious commitment to the love of
neighbor, will prepare students
who are good world citizens. Fair
enough, but this is only a part of the
story as many religions understand
it. A number of religions teach, as
well, love of God, and maintain
that the neighbor is loved well only
when she is loved in God, is loved
as God loves her. The religious university, then, teaches neighbor-love
well only when it has taught the
love of God well. Freedom and
rational self-determination in a
democratic society may vie with the
love of God for our greatest allegiance, or so these religions sometimes teach.
That, perhaps, is the nub of
the matter. What love directs the

construction of a university program of studies? On one way of
seeing things, the goal of a university is to teach the love of truth,
goodness, and beauty as well as
rational self-determination. If God
is the creator and sustainer of the
universe, then the ultimate object of
the student's love is God and the
university that does not order its
curriculum to the love of God and
to the love of the neighbor and the
love of God's creation in God is
defective. To order the university to
the love of one's fellow humans is
no bad thing, is, indeed, splendid.
But to love one's neighbors without
direction to the neighbor's true end
is but splendid vice.
A university education oriented to the heart's restless longing
for God will travel many of the
paths of Nussbaum's noble Stoic
cosmopolitanism, will admire many
of the virtues of the world citizen.
even while suspecting that Nussbaum's spartan Stoicism cannot
adequately sustain the character of
her citizens. (Is the sympathetic
reading of literature sufficient given
the incessant demands of the fat
relentless ego?) But for the religious
university to travel only the same
paths and to forget the inspiration
that guides the journey is to revel in
wilderness wanderings. It should be
said, however, that even if Nussbaum is helpful only in improving
our time in the wilderness, that is
no small gift.
Thomas D. Kennedy
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LILL Lf FELLOWS F~Oo~AM
1n HUMAnl Tl ES RnorHE A~TS
The Lilly Fellows Program in Humanities and the Arts,
established in 1991, addresses two critical problems faced by
church-related institutions of higher learning in the United
States. First, though many church-related colleges and
universities are seeking to recover or refortify a sense of purpose
and identity, there has been no sustained national conversation
expressly designed to renew and deepen a sense of corporate
vocation among these schools. Second , settings for the
formation of younger scholars who wish to pursue their
vocational commitments at church-related colleges and
universities scarcely exist in the United States. In brief, the
hegemony of the secular research university has gradually
eroded both institutional and individual senses of Christian
vocation, leaving many schools and many Christian scholars in
need of renewed vision and mutual support.
The Lilly Fellows Program therefore consists of two
distinct but integrated programmatic initiatives. First, it has
established and will steadily expand a national network of
church-related institutions of higher learning and sustain among
them a discussion of Christian understandings of the nature of
the academic vocation. The network represents a diversity of
denominational traditions, institutional types, and geographical
locations. Representatives from the network institutions meet
annually for a national conference . Additionally , several
workshops and mini-conferences are scheduled annually on the
campuses of the network institutions. A biannual newsletter
reports network activities, provides listings of young scholars
interested in teaching at church-related institutions, and includes
reports from conferences and workshops.
Recent developments include the formation of a
National Network Board, consisting of twelve Network
representatives. Together with the Lilly Fellows Program staff,
this Board has devised several new Network projects:
• A series of Summer Seminars for College Teachers
designed for junior faculty from Network Schools;
• An annual Summer Institute for Fellowship
Applicants and Advanced Graduate Students, each
exploring a fundamentals issue addressed by the Lilly
Fellows Program;
• A series of Mentoring Programs on Network
campuses intended to provide junior faculty members
the opportunity to acculturate themselves into the ethos
and traditions of a particular institution.

The Lilly Fellows Program is also in the process of
gathering materials for three new publications: a bibliography of
articles and books relevant to church-related higher education in
America; a guidebook for mentoring; and a collection of essays
and reviews related to Christian higher education.
Second, the Lilly Fellows Program offers young
scholars in the humanities and the arts a chance to renew and
deepen their sense of vocation, and to enrich their postdoctoral
intellectual and spiritual life within a Christian community of
learning. Each academic year Postdoctoral Fellows are
appointed for two-year periods, selected from candidates
interested in considering the relationship between Christianity
and the academic vocation. The Fellows are prepared, through a
variety of teaching experiences, through participation in a
weekly colloquium, and through regular association with
mentors, to seek permanent employment within church-related
institutions of higher learning. A total of eighteen postdoctoral
fellowships have been awarded to date as part of the Lilly
Fellows Program in Humanities and the Arts
The Program also sponsors one Senior Fellow, selected
from nominees from the network schools, to spend the year on
the Valparaiso University campus, working closely with the
Lilly Fellows Program. The Senior Fellow engages in research
and writing, is a resource person for the Postdoctoral Fellows,
participates in a year-long colloquium, and contributes to the
annual conference the following fall. The first seven Senior
Fellows came from the following Network institutions: Calvin
College, Goshen College, Saint Mary's College, Boston
College, Berea College, Furman University, and Loyola
Marymount University.
These initiatives bring focus, clarity, and energy to a
critical aspect of a much larger project: the imaginative
reformulation and implementation of an agenda for churchrelated higher learning for the twenty-first century.

For more information please contact:
Arlin G. Meyer, Program Director
Lilly Fellows Program in Humanities and the Arts
Valparaiso University
Valparaiso, Indiana 46383
Telephone: (219) 464-5317/5770
Fax: (219) 464-5496

PERIODICALS
POSTAGE
PAID

